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THE INDEFENSIBLE DUTY TO DEFEND
Neal Devins* & Saikrishna Prakash**
Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch
must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine
Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the du-
ties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence,
while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage
Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional.
Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better
explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its indepen-
dence and status. By currying favor with the courts and Congress, the
Department helps preserve its near-monopoly on government litigation au-
thority. Third, our analysis of refusals to defend shows that the duty to de-
fend only lightly constrains the executive, posing no real barrier to decisions
not to defend the constitutionality of laws. Finally, the duty to defend serves
no constitutional purpose. Its supposed benefits arise from getting the courts
to opine on the constitutionality of laws. But courts typically have that oppor-
tunity as a result of executive enforcement of a law it believes is unconstitu-
tional. Nothing further is gained by having the executive voice insincere and
halfhearted arguments when others sincerely can advance strong ones. Or,
we should say, nothing except enhancing the DOJ in the eyes of Congress and
the courts at the expense of the President’s constitutional vision, which is
what the duty to defend is all about.
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INTRODUCTION
The belief that the President must enforce and defend laws that he
thinks unconstitutional is widely held, although there is substantial disa-
greement over the obligation’s scope. Consider reactions to President
Barack Obama’s February 2011 decision to enforce but not defend the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).1 For some, the President’s decision to
enforce but not defend the DOMA was “honest, transparent, and respect-
1. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Hon. John
H. Boehner, Speaker of the House (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter], available at
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/documents/2011/02/letter-from-the-attorney-general-to-
congress-on-litigation-involving-the-defense-of-marriage-act.php?page=1 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating President will enforce but not defend the DOMA). In July
2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed papers explaining why it thought same-sex
classifications were subject to strict scrutiny review and, consequently, why the DOMA is
unconstitutional. See generally Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss,
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. C 3:10-
00257-JSW) (arguing DOMA violates Equal Protection). In response, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited the administration’s nondefense of the DOMA in lifting the stay of
a district court’s ruling that the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Act” violated the First Amendment.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Nos. 10-56634, 10-56813, at 2 (9th Cir. July 6,
2011), 2011 WL 2637191, at *1 (order lifting stay of district court’s judgment).
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ful of the rule of law.”2 Others were critical, claiming that because the Act
is not clearly unconstitutional, he ought to have defended it.3
The President’s critics and defenders are both mistaken. Contrary to
his critics, there simply is no duty to defend federal statutes the President
believes are unconstitutional. Contrary to his defenders, there likewise is
no duty to enforce such laws. Given President Obama’s belief that the
DOMA is unconstitutional,4 he should neither enforce nor defend it.
The duty to enforce seems premised on the belief that courts should
be, as Obama Attorney General Eric Holder declared, “the final arbiter
of . . . constitutional claims.”5 The duty to defend seems grounded on the
view that the Department of Justice generally should serve as Congress’s
lawyer—defending congressional statutes that it or the President thinks
are unconstitutional. Yet nothing in the Constitution requires the
President to either subordinate his constitutional vision to the courts or
serve as the mouthpiece of Congress before the courts. To the contrary,
the duties to enforce and defend are inconsistent with the Constitution’s
text and structure, both of which speak to the President’s responsibility to
2. Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, The New Republic (Mar. 1, 2011, 12:00
AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). For a nearly identical argument, see Peter M. Shane,
Not Defending DOMA: A Conscientious and Responsible Decision, Huffington Post (Feb.
25, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m-shane/not-defending-
defense-of-marriage_b_828348.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (praising
Holder’s letter as a “careful, highly deliberate step . . . consistent with the . . . executive’s
obligations towards the Constitution and the rule of law”).
3. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend
DOMA, The Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/
23/the-executive-power-grab-in-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing that by basing nondefense of DOMA on “a contested theory of the
constitutionality of laws regulating gay rights . . . the Obama Administration has moved the
goalposts of the usual role of the Executive branch”); Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is
Wrong on DOMA, Huffington Post (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-on-dom_b_827676.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing nondefense of DOMA “sets a terrible precedent”); John Yoo, Obama
Pushes the Limits of Executive Power in DOMA Decision, Ricochet (Feb. 23, 2011, 2:26
PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Obama-Pushes-the-Limits-of-Executive-Power-in-
DOMA-Decision (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (asserting that “decision to no
longer enforce [DOMA] . . . uses the legal system to short-circuit the normal political
process”).
4. We take no position on the constitutionality of the DOMA. Indeed, our argument
does not turn on whether one believes that the federal government’s failure to recognize
gay marriage is unconstitutional or immoral. Even those who believe that the DOMA is
constitutional should embrace our claims, or so we hope.
But we do note that because section 3 of DOMA is merely definitional it cannot, by
itself, be unconstitutional. When the Administration says that section 3 is unconstitutional,
we assume that what it means is that all those substantive laws that extend benefits based
on marital status are unconstitutional because, pursuant to section 3, they
unconstitutionally do not extend to gay marriages. In other words, when someone says that
section 3 is unconstitutional what they really mean is that statutes that incorporate its
definition of marriage are unconstitutional.
5. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5.
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preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as he understands it and
even when the threat comes in the form of a statute. These duties are also
normatively unattractive as they eliminate (or at least muzzle) a check on
unconstitutional laws—a check wielded by the President, the only elected
official with a nationwide constituency.
But even if one shrinks from our broad claim about the duty to en-
force, meaning that one believes the President should enforce statutes
that he believes are unconstitutional, there are absolutely no good consti-
tutional reasons to preserve the duty to defend. There is no plausible
argument that the Constitution obliges the President to press constitu-
tional claims that he finds unpersuasive or objectionable, especially
where others stand ready to make sincere arguments in defense of a law.6
If the goal is to have the courts judge the constitutionality of laws, the
duty to enforce largely satisfies this goal, making the duty to defend
pointless. Hence, even if one supposes that our broad claim is misguided,
almost everyone should embrace our narrow reform to abolish the un-
necessary duty to defend.
Our aim is to strip away the high-sounding justifications, shed light
on the duties to enforce and defend, and judge the source and strengths
of their foundations. Rather than being grounded in the Constitution,
the duties actually serve the bureaucratic interests of the Justice
Department, and, to a lesser extent, the political interests of the White
House. Even though the duty to defend constrains the Justice
Department (so that the Department occasionally defends federal stat-
utes that it thinks are unconstitutional), the duty actually benefits the
DOJ. Like all bureaucracies, the DOJ wants to retain and expand its au-
thority while simultaneously protecting itself from political interference.
Via the duties to enforce and defend and other traditions that emphasize
the judiciary’s power to settle legal disputes, the DOJ curries favor with
the courts and Congress. The duties flatter the courts because they exalt
them as the final arbiters of constitutional questions. The duties satisfy
Congress because members prefer judicial (rather than executive) resolu-
tion of constitutional disputes. Moreover, the DOJ, which has a near-mo-
nopoly on government litigation and very little regulatory power, benefits
when the courts have the last word on the constitutionality of federal stat-
utes, in much the same way that litigators benefit from the dominance of
courts. For its part, the White House is not especially interested in spend-
ing political capital on disputes over the constitutionality of federal stat-
utes and, as such, the President is generally happy to adhere to the rheto-
ric of enforce and defend.
6. The DOMA episode illustrates the ability of others to come to a law’s defense.
Following the DOJ’s announcement that it would not defend the statute, the House’s
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (made up of three members of the Republican majority
and two members of the Democratic minority) took up the defense of the statute. See
Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Step in to Defend Marriage Act and Dodge a Party
Debate, N.Y. Times, March 5, 2011, at A16.
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We speak of rhetoric here because the duties to defend and enforce
are not as binding as one might suppose. In fact, the duties are suffi-
ciently malleable that when the DOJ leadership or the White House does
not want to enforce or defend a federal statute, the duties pose no real
obstacles. For instance, the DOJ has conveniently crafted a separation of
powers exception, making the duties irrelevant on constitutional ques-
tions likely to be of most interest to the White House and DOJ leader-
ship.7 Other exceptions are created, creatively interpreted, or expanded
as needed.
In sum, the modern duties to enforce and defend curry good will
with Congress and the courts, marginally favor the DOJ and its court-
centered toolkit, and pose no real barrier to political appointees seeking
changes in judicial doctrine. This is why the duties persist, despite having
no basis in the Constitution.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I details numerous ap-
proaches to the duties to enforce and defend. Some administrations de-
nied there were duties to enforce or defend; others claimed that the exec-
utive was always obliged to defend and enforce until a court ruled a
statute unconstitutional; and in between these poles are a dizzying num-
ber of approaches. By showing that the DOJ has frequently recast the
duties, especially in modern times, Part I undermines the idea that the
duties are obligatory. Duties are not so binding if they change every eight
years or as convenience suits.
Part II explains why the duties to enforce and defend have no place
in the constitutional system. Each branch has powers and duties that re-
quire it to engage in constitutional interpretation, with nothing obliging
it to adhere to the constitutional reasoning of others. The duties to en-
force and defend are at odds with this principle, for they compel the
President to not only execute schemes he believes to be unconstitutional
but also to defend them in court. This conclusion is buttressed by the text
of the Constitution—the President’s oath “to preserve, protect, and de-
fend” it, the power to veto laws he thinks unconstitutional, the duty to
“take Care that the laws be faithfully executed,” the power to seek opin-
ions from executive officers, and, finally, the power to grant pardons.
This conclusion is also supported by historical practice, including
Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to enforce the Sedition Act,8 Bill Clinton’s
support of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,9 and President
7. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (noting DOJ support for separation of R
powers exception); infra note 251 and accompanying text (explaining that separation of R
powers disputes are highly visible and, as such, likely to be of interest to White House and
DOJ officials).
8. See infra notes 20–29 and accompanying text. R
9. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 Pub. Papers
2000, 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993) (“[T]his act reverses the Supreme Court’s decision in
Employment Division against Smith and reestablishes a standard that better protects all
Americans of all faiths in the exercise of their religion . . . .”).
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Obama’s efforts to limit the Supreme Court’s invalidation of corporate
election spending limits.10
Employing bureaucratic theory, Part III argues that the true source
of the duties to enforce and defend is the self-interest of the Department
of Justice. The duties are among those norms that the DOJ embraces in
order to shield it from external influence and enhance the status of its
lawyers. At the same time, the duties are malleable enough to be imple-
mented in ways that respect both the President’s quite limited constitu-
tional agenda and Congress’s desire for the courts to settle constitutional
questions (by creating justiciable cases, typically by enforcing federal
statutes).11
Part IV focuses on cases where the DOJ has refused to defend.12 We
show that the DOJ implements the duty to defend in ways that simultane-
ously (1) embrace a court-centered focus that strengthens ties between
the DOJ and the courts and Congress, (2) permit the DOJ to favor presi-
dential power in separation of powers cases, and (3) allow significant wig-
gle room so that the President and DOJ can advance their constitutional
agendas outside of separation of powers. Consistent with Part III, Part IV
shows that the duty to defend principally serves to protect the DOJ as a
bureaucracy.
Part V considers the practical upshot of abandoning the duties to
enforce and defend. It responds to the claim that eliminating the duties
yields bad consequences, namely presidential unilateralism and lawless-
ness. We predict that nonenforcement will likely occur only in those few
cases where the law runs afoul of the President’s clearly enunciated con-
stitutional vision. We also call attention to the costs of the duties. One
such cost is that the DOJ implements the duties in ways that obfuscate the
President’s constitutional vision. For example, after concluding that the
DOMA was subject to heightened scrutiny because it reflected animus
towards gays and lesbians and that it was unconstitutional under that stan-
dard, Attorney General Holder contended that courts would find the
DOMA constitutional under rational basis review.13 He thereby suggested
that the DOJ would defend the DOMA if courts applied the lower stan-
dard, meaning that the Administration might defend a statute that it be-
lieves is motivated by animus to a class of citizens.14 Rather than having
10. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
2010 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 8 (Jan. 27, 2010) (encouraging Congress to pass bill
regulating corporate election spending).
11. Because of increasing party polarization, there is reason to question Congress’s
continued willingness to meaningfully limit DOJ decisionmaking. See infra notes 220–243
and accompanying text (detailing interaction between congressional and DOJ authority).
12. For reasons detailed in Part IV, there is no way to systematically study presidential
nonenforcement. See infra note 257. R
13. See infra notes 293–298 and accompanying text (discussing Holder’s analysis of R
DOMA’s constitutionality).
14. See infra note 300 and accompanying text (highlighting inconsistency of Attorney R
General’s positions).
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his Administration’s actions turn on what standard of review a court will
(or should) apply, President Obama should just declare what he believes
the constitutional standard to be and apply it.
I. THE DUTIES TO ENFORCE AND DEFEND AND THEIR MANY VARIATIONS
Under the duty to defend, the federal executive must defend the
constitutionality of laws before the courts.15 The duty to defend is mean-
ingful because, as we use the term, it only comes into play when the exec-
utive believes a law is unconstitutional. When the executive believes a fed-
eral law is constitutional, that conviction, rather than the duty to defend,
leads the executive to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The duty re-
quires the executive to mouth insincere arguments, in the same way that
private sector lawyers advance their clients’ interests. In a sense, the duty
envisions the DOJ as the lawyer and Congress as the client.16
The duty to defend is typically seen as a subset of a broader duty to
enforce the law.17 As such, one might expect that the two duties would be
coterminous. Yet the modern DOJ treats the duties as distinct. For in-
stance, Attorney General Eric Holder recently distinguished the two
duties, noting that the President would enforce, but not defend, the
DOMA.18 President Bill Clinton took the same approach with respect to a
law ousting individuals with HIV from the military.19
These brief descriptions of the duties to enforce and defend obscure
the varying approaches that the executive has embraced over time. We
recount some of these wildly disparate systems below.
15. The duty to defend does not require the executive to defend laws in the court of
public opinion. Though one supposes that the executive could speak with dissonant voices,
urging a law’s constitutionality before the courts and simultaneously denouncing it to the
public, we do not know if this has ever occurred. Administrations have occasionally filed
briefs defending the constitutionality of a law while simultaneously signaling, in some way,
doubts. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1081–83 (2001)
[hereinafter Waxman, Defending] (discussing instances in which presidents signed laws
while objecting to their constitutionality).
16. For an insightful critique of this proposition, see generally Brianne S. Gorod, The
Principal-Agent Problem: Defending Executive Non-Defense, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=198
1744 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
17. See, e.g., The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally
Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 276 (1980) (discussing duties in context
of constitutional balance). See generally Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1077 n.14 R
(noting “salient difference” between duty to defend and duty to enforce); Note, Executive
Discretion and Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 Yale L.J. 970, 972–75 (1983)
[hereinafter Note, Executive Discretion] (discussing executive discretion over defense of
statutes as subset of enforcement requirement). Again, as we use the phrase, the duty to
enforce only comes into play when the President believes the law is unconstitutional.
18. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 6.
19. See Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military
HIV Ban: A New Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 591, 638 (1997) (contrasting decision not to defend with decisions not to enforce).
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The first President to confront a law he believed unconstitutional
utterly rejected any notion that he had to enforce and defend it. The
Sedition Act, passed during the Presidency of John Adams, criminalized
criticism of high-ranking federal officers.20 Believing it was beyond the
powers of Congress and violated the First Amendment,21 Thomas
Jefferson resolved to render it a nullity. Besides pardoning Sedition Act
convicts,22 he took other steps. Though the Act expired when he took
office, its end did not terminate or prevent prosecutions of those who
already had committed violations.23 Nonetheless, Jefferson terminated
ongoing cases24 and never initiated new cases based on sedition that pre-
dated his Administration.25
Two points are worth noting. First, Jefferson acted on his own sense
of the Constitution. He clearly disagreed with the constitutional judg-
ments of the Congress that enacted the Sedition Act.26 Likewise, he did
not look to the views of the Federalist-dominated courts as a prism that
might bend his approach to the Constitution.27 Several judges, including
Supreme Court Justices, had dismissed claims that the Act was unconstitu-
tional.28 Second, as discussed in Part II, rather than supposing he had a
duty to enforce and defend the Act, Jefferson declared that he had a duty
to treat the Act as a nullity.29
20. Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97.
21. See Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 540, 541 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) (rejecting Alien and Sedition Acts as
unconstitutional).
22. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 57, 57 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s
Sons 1897) (describing decision to stop prosecution of crimes under Alien and Sedition
Act).
23. Alien and Sedition Act § 4, 1 Stat. at 597.
24. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Duane (May 23, 1801), in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 22, at 54, 55 (indicating intention to “order a R
nolle prosequi” in such cases); Message from Thomas Jefferson to the Senate, in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 22 at 56, 56 (noting message may never have
been transmitted to the Senate).
25. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, 1664–66 (2008) [hereinafter Prakash, Duty to
Disregard] (describing Jefferson’s rationale for ending prosecutions).
26. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 1 The
Adams-Jefferson Letters 274, 275 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) (terming Alien and Sedition
Act a “nullity”).
27. See The Paragraph Omitted from the Final Draft of Jefferson’s Message to
Congress, December 8, 1801, in 3 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall app. A at
605, 605 (1919) (propounding each branch’s independent duty to judge constitutionality);
see also Prakash, Duty to Disregard, supra note 25, at 1667–68 & nn.238–244 (describing R
Jefferson’s arguments for independent constitutional review).
28. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 50, 62 (2004)
(noting Justices William Patterson and Samuel Chase concluded Act was constitutional).
29. See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing executive duty to avoid
aiding or abetting constitutional violations).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-MAR-12 16:45
2012] THE INDEFENSIBLE DUTY TO DEFEND 515
Jefferson’s uncompromising view held sway until 1865,30 when
Attorney General James Speed, writing just days after the assassination of
Abraham Lincoln, added nuance. Speed wrote that an act vesting ap-
pointment powers in an assessor was unconstitutional, “void,” and should
be ignored by the new President, Andrew Johnson.31 The nuance came
when Speed claimed that the President should act on his own constitu-
tional conclusions, at least until courts had issued “an authoritative expo-
sition” of the law.32 Speed thereby implied that once courts had authori-
tatively determined a law’s constitutionality the executive had to
acquiesce.33
In 1868, President Andrew Johnson followed the Jeffersonian rule of
ignoring a law he believed was unconstitutional. For his violation of the
1867 Tenure in Office Act, Johnson was impeached and almost con-
victed.34 Johnson’s managers argued that, like any man, he ought to be
able to defy laws that he believed were unconstitutional.35 They also ar-
gued that Johnson had chosen to disregard the law because doing so was
the only way to get the courts to decide the Act’s constitutionality.36 As
Johnson’s counsel and former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis
put it, when “a question arises whether a particular law has cut off a
power confided to [the President] . . . , and he alone can cause a judicial
decision to come between the two branches of the government to say
which of them is right,” the President can ignore the law and set the stage
for a judicial resolution.37
The 1919 opinion of A. Mitchell Palmer was a marked departure
from the opinions of prior executives. At the outset, the Attorney General
denied he could “declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional,” save for
30. President James Monroe and James Buchanan’s Attorney General Jeremiah Black
both took Jeffersonian stances. See Special Message of James Monroe to the Senate of the
United States, in 2 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents:
1789–1897, at 129, 133 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat’l Literature 1897) (stating
Monroe’s view that a law restraining his ability to appoint would “be void”); see also
Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469 (1866) (noting Black’s view that
“[e]very law is to be carried out so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, and no
further,” and “the sound part of it must be executed, and the vicious portion of it suffered
to drop”).
31. See Appointment of Assistant Assessors of Internal Revenue, 11 Op. Att’y Gen.
209, 212–14 (1865) (noting Speed’s belief that vesting act was “clearly unconstitutional”
because “power of appointing such officers devolves on the President”).
32. Id. at 214.
33. Id.
34. 2 Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, Before the Senate of
the United States, on Impeachment by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors 498 (1868) [hereinafter Trial of Andrew Johnson] (revealing only one
more vote needed to successfully convict Andrew Johnson).
35. 1 Trial of Andrew Johnson, supra note 34, at 387 (statement of Benjamin Curtis) R
(“[I]t may be and has been a high and patriotic duty of a citizen to raise a question
whether a law is within the Constitution of the country.”)
36. Id.
37. Id.
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when it infringed upon presidential power.38 With respect to an act of
“general application,” “it is the duty of the executive department to ad-
minister it until it is declared unconstitutional by the courts.”39 Palmer
never cited anything for this proposition and seemed unaware of early
practice and opinions, for he never discussed either. In any event, as if to
underscore the difficulty with hewing to his new rule, Palmer considered
the constitutionality of a law of general application nonetheless, princi-
pally because a predecessor had suggested that a similar law was unconsti-
tutional.40 Even more perplexing, he ended by saying that the relevant
law was not “so clearly unconstitutional that an executive officer would be
justified in ignoring or disregarding it,” suggesting that executives could
act upon the belief that an act was clearly unconstitutional.41
The very next year, the Woodrow Wilson Administration removed
Portland Postmaster Frank S. Myers without receiving the Senate’s
consent, as the 1867 Tenure of Office Act required.42 Perhaps this fit
within Palmer’s presidential prerogative exception. Or perhaps the
Administration thought the law was clearly unconstitutional. Whatever
the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the President had power to re-
move Myers, saying nothing hinting that the President either had a duty
to honor the removal restriction or a duty to defend the Act.43 Through-
out the case, the executive had decried the Act as unconstitutional.44
In the years to come, several of Palmer’s successors vigorously en-
dorsed his reluctance to question a federal law’s constitutionality.45 In-
deed, in 1937, Attorney General Homer Cummings claimed that only the
President can have a “proper interest in questioning the validity of a mea-
sure passed by Congress, and that such interest ceases” after a President
signs or vetoes a bill.46 Cummings’s rule suggested that Presidents could
38. Income Tax—Salaries of President and Fed. Judges, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 476
(1919).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 489.
42. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 56 (1926).
43. Id. at 176.
44. Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and Its Wayward Successors: Going Postal
on the Removal Power, in Presidential Power Stories 165, 173–74, 177 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
45. See Duty of Disbursing Officers to Make Disbursements Required Under the
Agric. Adjustment Act, 38 Op. Att’y Gen. 252, 253 (1935) (claiming that ministerial officers
cannot question constitutionality of legislation that has no bearing on their constitutional
rights); see also Political Activity by State or Local Emps., 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 158, 160 (1942)
(refusing to opine whether Hatch Act is unconstitutional after receiving letter forwarded
by President from civil service commission and quoting the Palmer opinion); Rendition of
Ops. on Constitutionality of Statutes—Fed. Home Loan Bank Act, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 11
(1937) (detailing why Attorney General should not question constitutionality of a statute
after President has approved).
46. Renditions of Ops. on Constitutionality of Statutes—Fed. Home Loan Bank Act,
39 Op. Att’y Gen at 14; see also Political Activity by State or Local Emps., 40 Op. Att’y Gen.
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raise constitutional objections only at presentment and that, after a bill
became law, every President had an ironclad duty to enforce it.
The question arose again in 1943, when Congress passed an appro-
priations rider barring salaries for executive officials thought to be com-
munists.47 Though President Franklin Roosevelt signed the bill, he de-
nounced the rider as “not only unwise and discriminatory, but
unconstitutional.”48 Roosevelt might have ignored the rider as unconsti-
tutional and paid salaries out of the appropriation that contained the
rider. Had he taken that path, there never would have been a case.49
Instead, because the Administration honored the rider and refused to
pay the salaries of the alleged communists,50 the aggrieved employees
had standing to bring suit. In court, the employees argued that the rider
amounted to an unconstitutional congressional removal and a bill of at-
tainder.51 The executive agreed, never defending the rider’s constitution-
ality.52 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovett, held that the rider
was a bill of attainder, that the Court could ignore it, and that the em-
ployees could be paid from the appropriation.53 Lovett may have been the
first case where the executive chose to honor an unconstitutional provi-
sion but not defend it.
In 1980, the phrase “duty to defend” found its way into DOJ opin-
ions.54 Prior to that time, there seems to have been no case where
Attorneys General or other officials used that term or discussed the con-
cept. The 1980 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion said that because
the DOJ had a duty to defend a statute’s constitutionality, except in “ex-
ceptional circumstances,” it “may be appropriate to bring to a court’s at-
at 160 (invoking Cummings’s quote, “it is not within the province of the Attorney General
to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional”).
47. See Act of July 12, 1943, 57 Stat. 451, 493 (prohibiting salaries for advocates of
overthrowing government by force); 89 Cong. Rec. 479–84, 656 (1943) (debating
constitutionality of appropriations rider). For a general discussion of the employee loyalty
dispute, see Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government
Employees, 58 Yale L.J. 1 (1948).
48. 89 Cong. Rec. 7521 (1943).
49. Had the executive ignored the rider and used the appropriated funds to pay the
employees, no one would have had standing to challenge the President’s action. No one
would have had standing because no one would have suffered a particularized injury by
virtue of the President’s decision to ignore the appropriations rider and pay the
governmental employees.
50. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 (1946) (noting respondents’ salaries
were discontinued pursuant to Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act).
51. Id. at 306.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 315–18.
54. Constitutionality of Legislation Establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Bd.,
4B Op. O.L.C. 697, 698 (1980). Another 1980 opinion, while embracing the duty, also said
that if a law was “transparently invalid” the executive had to ignore it. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty
to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 56
n.1 (1980). In making this point, the opinion defended Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to
enforce or defend the Sedition Act on these grounds. Id. at 58–59.
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tention any plausible argument that would permit the court to uphold a
statute.”55
A 1984 opinion of OLC chief Theodore Olsen declared that as a
general matter, it is for the “courts, and not the Executive, finally to de-
cide whether a law is constitutional” and that executive actions that pre-
clude judicial review “appear to be inconsistent with” the judicial power
granted to the courts.56 He listed two exceptions. First, the executive did
not have to enforce and defend where the statute upset the interbranch
equilibrium by impinging upon executive power.57 Second, the opinion
unequivocally said that “clearly unconstitutional” laws could be ignored.58
The second exception, which seemed to echo the last part of Attorney
General Palmer’s 1919 opinion, was apparently resuscitated in the 1970s
in testimony before Congress.59 Some have referred to this as a “risibility
test” or as one former official put it: “If trying to state the defense of the
statute does not have you rolling in the aisles, you should defend the
statute.”60
OLC head Walter Dellinger’s 1994 opinion added several wrinkles.61
He claimed that in nonseparation of powers controversies, the President
had to enforce and defend unless he concluded that the law was uncon-
stitutional and that the Supreme Court would agree.62 This arguably gave
the executive less latitude than the “clearly unconstitutional” threshold
because the President would have to enforce and defend all laws that the
Supreme Court might uphold, even those he thought clearly unconstitu-
tional. The opinion’s other new feature was the claim that decisions to
enforce could be based on a desire to create a justiciable case.63 This
55. Constitutionality of Legislation Establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Bd.,
4B Op. O.L.C. at 697.
56. Recommendation that Dep’t of Justice Not Defend Constitutionality of Certain
Provisions of Bankr. Amendments and Fed. Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183, 194
(1984).
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 194; see also The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally
Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 275–77, 279 (1980) (claiming executive
could choose not to defend transparently invalid statutes that upset equilibrium between
executive and legislative branches).
59. See Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
12 (1975–1976) (statement of Rex Lee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice)
(claiming executive would not defend “patently unconstitutional” laws and asserting that
this had happened only once).
60. Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States:
Pre-Reagan Panel, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1, 17, 31 (2003) (statement of Frank Easterbrook).
61. Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 199 (1994).
62. Id. at 200 (“As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would
sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute,
notwithstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue.”).
63. Id. at 201 (“Also relevant [to the decision to enforce] is the likelihood that
compliance or non-compliance will permit judicial resolution of the issue.”).
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meant that sometimes, as in the case of penal or regulatory laws, the exec-
utive would enforce a law it believed to be unconstitutional in order to
create a justiciable controversy. Other times, nonenforcement would pave
the way to the courts, as in the case of benefits cases and alleged infringe-
ments of presidential power. Under either scenario, the DOJ could
choose not to defend in court.
In 1996, President Bill Clinton enforced the statutory ouster of HIV-
positive members of the military but declined to defend its constitutional-
ity.64 An OLC letter meant to explain the decision instead muddied the
waters by stating there were “a variety of factors that bear on whether the
Department will defend the constitutionality of a statute” without identi-
fying those factors or how they bore on the act in question.65
In his recent letter to House Speaker John Boehner, Attorney
General Eric Holder added to the complexity. After arguing that the
DOMA was unconstitutional, Holder noted that President Obama
agreed.66 The Attorney General then said that the President had decided
to continue to enforce the DOMA, so as to satisfy his Faithful Execution
Duty and to respect both the Congress that enacted the DOMA and the
“judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”67 Fi-
nally, the Attorney General declared the DOJ would not defend the
DOMA.68
The complexity came in the explanation for the decision not to de-
fend. Holder first distinguished plausible or professionally responsible ar-
guments from reasonable arguments.69 Prior executives, when they em-
braced the duty to defend, had emphasized that a defense was necessary
whenever a court might uphold a law as constitutional. Despite all but
acknowledging that there were professionally responsible or plausible ar-
guments that section 3 was constitutional, Holder declared that the DOJ
would not defend.70 Because the executive saw no reasonable arguments
for the constitutionality of section 3, it had no obligation to make plausi-
ble or professionally responsible but unreasonable arguments in defense
64. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 567, 110 Stat. 186, 328 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (1996)) (repealed 1996). See
generally Gussis, supra note 19, at 638 (noting President Clinton’s refusal to defend law he R
believed unconstitutional).
65. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 7 (Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Though the Clinton strategy was designed in part to ensure judicial
review, Congress repealed the statute, thus mooting the controversy. An Act of Apr. 26,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–30 (repealing 10
U.S.C. § 1177 (1996)).
66. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. (“[T]he Department in the past has declined to defend statutes despite the
availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part because the Department does
not consider every plausible argument to be a ‘reasonable’ one.”).
70. Id.
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of it. Holder’s distinction between plausible and reasonable arguments
seems inconsistent with past practice. At a minimum, it is in grave tension
with the 1980 opinion, which said that because the DOJ had a duty to
defend a statute’s constitutionality, it “may be appropriate to bring to a
court’s attention any plausible argument that would permit the court to
uphold a statute.”71
Holder gave an additional reason not to defend, perhaps sensing
that the distinction between plausible and reasonable arguments might
seem artificial or nonexistent. Citing a law review article by former
Solicitor General Seth Waxman, Holder cryptically said that when the
President declared that a statute was unconstitutional, that was sufficient
reason not to defend its constitutionality before the courts.72 This sug-
gested that when the President concluded that a law was unconstitutional,
it did not matter whether reasonable arguments could be made in its
defense. Purposefully or not, Holder had captured the discretionary na-
ture of the duty to defend.
The approaches of different administrations are dizzying in their
number and, occasionally, in their complexity. Some executives have
claimed that the President should never enforce (much less defend) laws
the President believes to be unconstitutional, no matter what the courts
might say. Early practice well reflects this belief. At the other extreme is
the claim that the President cannot raise constitutional objections after a
bill has become law, the implication being that he has to enforce (and
presumably) defend every single federal statute. In between are a multi-
tude of approaches, including: that the executive should decline to en-
force a law it believes is unconstitutional unless and until a court has con-
cluded that it is constitutional; that it may (or must) decline to enforce or
defend any law that impinges upon presidential power; that it may (or
must) decline to enforce or defend when a law is clearly unconstitutional
or lacks reasonable defenses; that it must enforce and defend unless the
President believes that the law is unconstitutional and that the Supreme
Court would agree; and that sometimes it should enforce, but not de-
fend, a law it believes is unconstitutional. In any event, if the past is pro-
logue, the Holder letter is unlikely to usher a new era of stability in ap-
proaches to the duties to enforce and defend. The letter likely means no
more than that the Obama DOJ will not defend the DOMA, at least
where strict scrutiny applies.
This Part ends with two related observations. One approach notably
absent from this list is the claim that while the President always should
create a justiciable case in order to facilitate judicial resolution of a law’s
71. Constitutionality of Legislation Establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Bd.,
4B Op. O.L.C. 697, 697 (1980).
72. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5 (“Moreover, the Department has declined to
defend a statute ‘in cases which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the
statute is unconstitutional,’ as is the case here.” (quoting Waxman, Defending, supra note
15, at 1083)). R
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constitutionality, he never should defend laws he thinks are unconstitu-
tional. If judicial resolution is desirable as a means of checking executive
interpretations of the Constitution, this approach facilitates such a check
while never requiring the executive to voice insincere arguments. For the
most part, this approach means that the president has a duty to enforce
federal laws.73 In cases involving the separation of powers and the dis-
bursement of funds, however, there would be no duty to enforce or de-
fend, as nonenforcement would be the only means of creating a justicia-
ble controversy.
The failure of the DOJ to articulate this strategy is curious as it high-
lights the disjunction between rhetoric and practice. Focusing on mod-
ern practice, with all its twists and turns, while officials often express fe-
alty to the duties to enforce and defend, they often act as if they only have
a duty to create a justiciable controversy. Indeed, when justifying a deci-
sion not to enforce a restriction on presidential power, the executive
notes that nonenforcement helps create a judicial controversy. Likewise
when explaining a decision not to defend a federal statute, the executive
often calls attention to the fact that the issue will nonetheless be litigated
and that the courts will continue to serve as “the final arbiter of the con-
stitutional claims.”74 In so doing, the executive unwittingly highlights that
when it comes to the duties to enforce and to defend, there is less than
meets the eye.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DUTIES TO ENFORCE AND DEFEND
The duties to defend and to enforce are anathema to the text, struc-
ture, and early history of the Constitution. In fact, as President Thomas
Jefferson argued,75 the President faces the opposite obligation: He can-
not subordinate himself to either the courts or Congress by enforcing
statutes he believes are unconstitutional. Rather than resting on the
Constitution, the duties to enforce and defend, as Part III reveals, are
grounded on the bureaucratic interests of the Department of Justice.
Our constitutional claim rests on three principles.76 First, the Presi-
dent’s constitutional oath—he must “preserve, protect, and defend” the
73. This “create a justiciable controversy but never defend” approach differs from the
current DOJ policy. To begin with, whether enforcement or nonenforcement creates a
justiciable controversy is but one factor in the Holder multifactor test. It is not decisive on
the question of whether to enforce. Moreover, Holder’s letter endorsed a multifactor
approach with respect to defending, thereby suggesting that the DOJ would sometimes
defend statutes that it believed were unconstitutional. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5.
74. Id.
75. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, supra note 22, at 57 n.1
(discussing Jefferson’s pardon of William Duane from his conviction under Sedition Act);
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), in 9 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 22, at 253, 254 (discussing Jefferson’s
intervention on behalf of individuals prosecuted under Sedition Act).
76. We are hardly the first to enunciate these three principles or the first to conclude
that the President should act on his own sense of the Constitution. See, e.g., Frank H.
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Constitution77—forbids him from executing unconstitutional laws. The
President should no more implement the unconstitutional laws of
Congress than he should implement the unconstitutional machinations
of his aides.
Second, the Constitution never anoints one branch as the
Constitution’s supreme expositor. In particular, nothing in the
Constitution obliges any one to adopt the constitutional conclusions of
others. The Congress need not follow the President, the President need
not play second fiddle to Congress, and neither of them need kowtow to
the Supreme Court, much less the inferior ones. Because the
Constitution does not anoint an oracular institution with supreme au-
thority over the Constitution’s many Delphic phrases, the President may
decide whether a law is constitutional, no less than the courts.
Third, the only plausible source of either a duty to enforce or de-
fend, the Faithful Execution Clause, only applies to laws that are constitu-
tional and not to anything purporting to be law. Because unconstitutional
laws are void and hence not actual laws, the Clause does not oblige the
President to enforce or defend them.
After discussing each of these principles, this Part ends by consider-
ing major objections to our broad claim that the President cannot exe-
cute, or defend the constitutionality of, laws that he believes are unconsti-
tutional. We consider whether, if the President declined to enforce and
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 919–20 (1990) (noting
unconstitutional laws are “no laws at all” and so cannot bind President under Take Care
Clause); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84
Va. L. Rev. 333, 370 (1998) (“[I]f ‘laws’ includes all acts of Congress, then the Take Care
Clause imposes on the President an impossible obligation when a statute is logically
inconsistent with the Constitution.”); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1303 (1996) (arguing
President must refuse to enforce law he deems unconstitutional even if Congress, prior
Presidents, and courts believed it constitutional); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 221 (1994)
(“The President’s power to interpret the law is . . . precisely coordinate and coequal in
authority to the Supreme Court’s.”); Saikrishna Prakash & John C. Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1539, 1564–66 (2005) (reviewing Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004))
(arguing for increased executive branch role in interpreting the Constitution).
Some scholars take a more measured approach, one more reflective of the modern
DOJ position and more deferential to the courts. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 116 (1993) (contending
President’s ability to autonomously interpret Constitution is fact-specific); David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 61, 62 (asserting nonenforcement should
only be exercised “consistent with the resolution that the Supreme Court would reach”);
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 12 [hereinafter Johnsen,
Presidential Non-Enforcement] (arguing executive determination of unconstitutionality
must be respectful of separation of powers principles).
77. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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defend laws he regarded as unconstitutional, he would enjoy a sus-
pending power of the type enjoyed by seventeenth-century English Kings.
This Part also addresses whether the veto power suggests that after a bill
becomes law the President cannot act upon his constitutional beliefs.
A. Defending the Constitution Against Unconstitutional Laws
Article II obliges the President to take an oath to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution.78 When he identifies a law as unconstitu-
tional, he should not enforce it, for to execute it would be to erode,
rather than preserve, the Constitution. In other words, even as Article II
requires faithful execution of constitutional laws,79 it forbids the execu-
tive from executing unconstitutional ones.80
To see this more clearly, it is necessary to unpack the oath’s implica-
tions. At a minimum, the oath means that the President cannot violate
the Constitution himself. For instance, he cannot head next door to the
Treasury Department and withdraw funds without an appropriation.81
One of the oath’s other implications is that the President cannot aid or
abet constitutional transgressions, for in that case no one would say that
he was faithful to his oath to defend the Constitution. If his Secretaries
contrived a plan to muzzle the press, the President could not, consistent
with his oath and the First Amendment,82 support it or carry it into
execution.
78. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”).
79. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., Ben Geslison, “The Court Will Clean it Up”: Confronting the Specter of
Political Branch Dereliction of Duty, 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 165, 174–75 (2010) (arguing
President has duty to reject pending legislation he deems unconstitutional); Gary Lawson,
Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Dr. Seuss, 24 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 381, 390 (2001) (“The President has both the power and the duty to refuse to
enforce laws that he determines . . . are unconstitutional.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note
76, at 1304–06, 1312–13 (asserting a “power of presidential review” not prohibited by the R
veto power or Take Care Clause); Paulsen, supra note 76, at 261–62 (“[T]he President’s R
oath requires that the President exercise full legal review over the lawfulness of other
branches’ acts . . . .”); Prakash, Duty to Disregard, supra note 25, at 1629 (“[T]he President R
must take care not to faithfully execute unconstitutional laws.”).
For an argument that the intersection of the Faithful Execution Clause and
Supremacy Clause prohibits the President from enforcing unconstitutional laws, see
Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 919; see also Presidential Signing Statements Under the R
Bush Administration: A Threat to Checks and Balances and the Rule of Law?: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 118–21 (2007) (response to
posthearing questions from Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/congress/2007_hr/signing.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law . . . .”).
82. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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The duty to preserve the Constitution and thus to avoid aiding or
abetting constitutional violations does not apply differently depending
upon the source of the unconstitutional scheme. If a foreign despot pro-
poses that the President make him a Senator in return for a sizable con-
tribution to the Treasury, the President must decline.83 Because the
source of an unconstitutional scheme has no bearing on the President’s
obligation to avoid aiding and abetting violations, the obligation applies
equally to unconstitutional schemes emanating from Congress. For in-
stance, if a federal law ordered the President to disregard judicial judg-
ments, he would have to ignore the law because the Constitution vests the
judicial power with the courts.84
Because our claim counters recent executive opinion, some may be
dubious. Yet our reform is more consistent with a Constitution premised
on the nullity of unconstitutional statutes and the independence of the
branches. Consider comments about the separation of powers and consti-
tutional interpretation from our early history. While the Constitution was
up for ratification, James Wilson, one of the biggest influences on the
contours of Article II, affirmed that, like the courts, which had a duty to
declare unconstitutional laws void, the President “could shield himself,
and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.”85
Early Presidents agreed, believing that they had to resist unconstitu-
tional congressional laws and schemes. When the House sought John
Jay’s treaty instructions, George Washington rebuffed it on the ground
that because the House had no power over treaties, it had no business
demanding the instructions: “[A] just regard to the Constitution and to
the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbid[s] a
compliance with your request.”86 As he put it, his duty to “‘preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution’” necessarily constrained his desire to
“harmonize with the other branches.”87
83. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State . . . .” (emphasis added)).
84. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. For the argument that the executive must enforce judicial
judgments, see generally William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807 (2008)
[hereinafter Baude, Judgment]. For an argument that the President need not heed judicial
judgments, save for when they are criminal exonerations, see generally Paulsen, supra note
76. We believe that Paulsen’s argument unduly minimizes the grant of judicial power. In R
particular, his argument fails to explain adequately why the judicial power meant
something radically different in the English and American constitutional systems. While
the U.S. Constitution is of course different from the English Constitution of the eighteenth
century, we do not believe that the federal Constitution borrows a familiar phrase, the
“judicial power,” and implicitly drains it of its most significant power, the power to decide
cases.
85. James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 1, 1787),
in 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, supra note 21, at 443, 446 (emphasis omitted). R
86. H. Journal, 4th Cong., 1st Sess. 489 (1796) (letter from President George
Washington).
87. Id. at 488.
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President Thomas Jefferson took resistance to another level. As
noted above, Jefferson did not enforce the Sedition Act, defend its consti-
tutionality, and wishfully hope that the Federalist-dominated federal
courts saw through his arguments. Nor did he pursue the tack of enforc-
ing the Act, declining to defend its constitutionality, and then attempting
to convince courts that it was unconstitutional. Rather, Jefferson declined
to enforce the Act because of the “obligations of an oath to protect the
constitution, violated by an unauthorized act of Congress.”88 He had a
“duty to arrest [the Sedition Act’s] execution in every stage.”89
Jefferson’s rejection of the duty to enforce laws he believed were un-
constitutional meant that he could not offer any defense of the Sedition
Act’s constitutionality in court.90 Indeed, the executive’s failure to en-
force a regulatory or penal statute on the grounds that it is unconstitu-
tional often will preclude it from offering any constitutional defense of it.
The only time the failure to enforce a statute will lead to a judicial reck-
oning is when someone suffers an injury due to an executive’s refusal to
enforce. One such example is when the President refuses to abide by a
restriction on his own powers, such as when the President ignores a re-
moval restriction and the ousted officer sues in response.91 Another ex-
ample is when the President refuses to disburse statutory benefits on the
grounds that the statute is unconstitutional.92 In either context, the exec-
utive should not only refrain from defending the law’s constitutionality, it
should file briefs explaining its infirmities. To defend the Constitution in
this context requires the President to convince others in authority, in this
case the courts, that the unconstitutional laws should not be enforced by
the executive or the courts.
Modern OLC opinion recognizes that the President’s oath creates
“[a]n obligation to take action to resist encroachments on his institu-
tional authority by the Legislature [that] may be implied from [the]
oath.”93 This reading of the oath is indefensibly narrow. The oath does
not single out the office of the Presidency for special solicitude. Rather, it
requires the President to preserve, protect, and defend the entire
Constitution. The same oath that requires him to resist encroachments
88. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, supra note 26, at 276. R
89. Id. at 275.
90. Jefferson’s decision not to enforce precluded future judicial cases on the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Yet further opportunities for judicial exposition likely
would have served no purpose. The Federalist-dominated federal courts had already
upheld the Sedition Act’s constitutionality and likely would have continued to do so.
91. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–07 (1926) (discussing
President’s removal of postmaster from office without Senate consent).
92. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text (describing Franklin Roosevelt R
Administration’s decision not to defend appropriations rider barring salary disbursements
to suspected communists).
93. Recommendation that the Dep’t of Justice Not Defend the Constitutionality of
Certain Provisions of the Bankr. Amendments and Fed. Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op.
O.L.C. 183, 195 (1984).
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on Article II requires him to resist violations of the Article III and the Bill
of Rights. There is no principled, textual basis for why the OLC exalts the
executive’s pet peeve, infringements on executive power, above violations
of freedom of speech or federalism.
In sum, as compared to modern iterations of the duties to enforce
and defend, the views of Wilson, Washington, and Jefferson are far better
grounded in the Constitution. The President must refuse to honor con-
gressional schemes and statutes that he believes are unconstitutional be-
cause execution of them would make him an aider and abettor of uncon-
stitutional plans, thereby violating his oath to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution. Moreover, when the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute comes before a court, the President, as part of his duty to
defend the Constitution, should argue that the court ought to ignore the
unconstitutional statute.
B. Interpretive Independence
Thus far we argue that the President must defend the Constitution,
even when the threat comes from Congress. In so doing, we disagree with
the claim in Attorney General James Speed’s 1866 opinion, since echoed
by some of his successors, that the courts, the Supreme Court in particu-
lar, have a preeminent role in statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion.94 Instead, we assume that the executive should decide for itself
whether a law is constitutional.
Here we defend that assumption by advancing two related claims.
First, nothing in the Constitution requires any one branch to accept the
constitutional conclusions of another. Second, Presidents have long acted
on their own understanding of the Constitution, believing that they had
no duty to follow the constitutional readings of either Congress or the
courts.
As a matter of text and structure, the Constitution creates a govern-
ment in which each of the three federal branches may reach its own con-
stitutional conclusions. As each tries to satisfy its duties and exercises its
powers, each must weigh the constitutionality of its actions. In consider-
ing these grave matters, they may act upon their own conclusions, for the
Constitution never crowns one branch the supreme expositor of the en-
tire Constitution, such that the others must subscribe to its readings.95
Congress is supreme with respect to impeachment, the President with re-
spect to pardons, and the courts with respect to who wins cases. But the
Constitution nowhere anoints any entity or branch as the final arbiter of
the meaning of the laws or the Constitution.
94. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General R
Speed’s deference to courts’ ultimate authority).
95. See Harrison, supra note 76, at 369–74 (arguing for “symmetry between executive R
and judicial review”).
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Focusing on the President, the Constitution nowhere asks, much less
demands, the President to seek or accept the constitutional views of other
entities as he exercises his office and preserves, protects, and defends the
Constitution. Consistent with our claim, there are no means by which he
can demand the constitutional opinions of individual members or
Congress as a whole. Similarly, he cannot demand the opinions of a dis-
trict court judge, much less Justices.96
There are two exceptions to this general principle. First, the Presi-
dent can demand the Senate’s advice on nominees and treaties.97 Yet, as
the word “advice” connotes, he need not heed its suggestions, constitu-
tional or otherwise. Rather than serving as a generic check on the
President’s constitutional vision, the advice and consent provisions
merely establish that the President cannot appoint or make treaties with-
out Senate consent.
Second, the President may demand opinions of the principal officers
in the executive departments.98 Again it is clear from the Clause’s phras-
ing that the power to demand opinions (“he may require”) does not
come with any obligation to demand them or to follow any advice given.
The Clause, fairly construed, makes clear that the President can demand
opinions, if he wishes, and that he may make the final determination,
notwithstanding the advice he receives. It has always been thus.99 George
Washington received conflicting opinions about the constitutionality of a
National Bank before concluding that the Bank was constitutional;100
Barack Obama likewise received conflicting opinions about the legality of
his Libya campaign before concluding that he could bomb Libya.101
96. Presidents have asked for opinions from the Justices, sometimes formally and
sometimes less so. See David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American
Politics 93–94 (9th ed. 2011) (contrasting Supreme Court’s refusal to issue advisory
opinions with Justices’ practice of advising Presidents on public policy). But Justices are
under no obligation to respond. See, e.g., Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to
President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The
Advisory Role of Early Judges 179, 179–80 (1997) (declining to answer questions related to
French treaties).
97. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
99. See 4 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 110 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) (“[T]he President will personally have the credit of good, or the censure of bad
measures; since, though he may ask advice, he is to use his own judgment in following or
rejecting it.”); Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and
Character of John Adams, Esq., President of the United States (Oct. 24, 1800), in 25 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 169, 214 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977) (“A President is not
bound to conform to the advice of his Ministers. He is even under no positive injunction to
ask or require it.”).
100. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank
Bill: The Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 Duke L.J. 110, 112
(1994) (discussing Attorney General’s conclusion that Congress lacked power to create
National Bank).
101. See Charlie Savage, Two Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate,
N.Y. Times, June 17, 2011, at A1 (“President Obama rejected the views of top
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Given that the Constitution never requires the President to seek
opinions, never requires him to abide by any opinions received, and
never grants him the authority to demand them from other branches, it
seems clear that he need not accept the advice or legal conclusions that
come from Congress or the courts.102 He should give Congress the bene-
fit of the doubt on constitutional questions. And out of respect for the
learning reflected in judicial opinions, he should do the same with the
courts. But as a general matter, the President need no more adopt their
statutory and constitutional conclusions than they need embrace his.
The President’s interpretive independence from Congress should
surprise no one. When the President ponders a bill he certainly does not
adopt the implicit congressional view that should the bill become law it
would be constitutional.103 Indeed, if Presidents had to adopt congres-
sional views on the constitutionality of bills, they could never veto them
on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. Yet since George
Washington issued the first veto,104 Presidents have rejected bills based
on the belief that Congress’s constitutional conclusions can be wrong.105
Or consider pardons.106 The President does no violence to the
Constitution when he decides that someone convicted of a crime is wor-
thy of a pardon because he or she was the victim of an unconstitutional
law.107 This is so even if the judiciary has already concluded that the un-
derlying law is constitutional. If people languish in jail pursuant to a law
the President believes is unconstitutional, he should pardon them to
keep faith with his oath to preserve the Constitution.
What is true for presentment and pardons is equally true for law exe-
cution. The President need not embrace the implicit view of an enacting
Congress that all of its laws are constitutional. When President Jefferson
refused to bow to the constitutional theories of the Congress that passed
the Sedition Act or the President that signed it, he was right, for nothing
[government] lawyers . . . when he decided that he had the legal authority to continue . . .
the air war in Libya without Congressional authorization . . . .”).
102. For the split between those who believe that the President should act on his own
sense of the Constitution and those who believe the President should be deferential to the
courts, see supra note 76. R
103. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
104. See George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in Veto Messages of the
Presidents of the United States with the Action of Congress Thereon 9, 9 (Washington
D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1886) (discussing reason for veto).
105. Whether the President must veto bills that he believes contain unconstitutional
provisions is disputed. Compare William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 Ind.
L.J. 303, 304 (2011) (“In a wide range of cases, there is nothing wrong with signing
unconstitutional laws.”), with Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto
Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 81, 81 (2007) (“[T]he President has a
duty to veto bills when he believes they contain provisions that are unconstitutional.”).
106. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
107. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, supra note 22, at 57 n.1 R
(discussing Jefferson’s pardon of William Duane from his conviction under Sedition Act).
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in the Constitution obliged him to accept the constitutional theories of
the Fifth Congress or of John Adams.
The President’s interpretive independence from Congress makes a
good deal of sense. Congress is not designed to provide continuous gui-
dance to the executive or anyone else. It is a bicameral, deliberative, and
part-time body that reaches consensus only with difficulty. Moreover, it
would be able to do little else if it had to continually direct or counter-
mand, in real time, the executive’s preliminary decisions.
What of a court’s interpretation of the law—its sense of a law’s mean-
ing and its constitutionality? Many are certain that the executive must
follow the wisdom of the courts. As the Supreme Court intimates from
time to time, a court’s power “to say what the law is”108 is not just a power
to reach conclusions about what the law means in the course of deciding
cases; it is also the power to reach legal conclusions that all others must
respect and adopt. On several occasions, the Court had deemed itself “su-
preme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”109 and insisted
that its opinions and judgments are “the supreme law of the land.”110
Self-aggrandizing declarations of supremacy invite skepticism. The
Constitution never marks the Supreme Court supreme in its exposition of
the Constitution over Presidents, Congress, the states, or the people. In-
deed, as noted above, it says nothing about expositional supremacy at all,
suggesting that no such supremacy was established.111 Of course, the
Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution and federal statutes supreme
over state laws.112 But this supremacy clearly says nothing about an inter-
pretational hierarchy across branches, with the Supreme Court standing
at the head. Likewise, the Supreme Court is supreme over other courts, in
that other courts must look to the Supreme Court for guidance about
federal statutes and the Constitution. But that intrabranch supremacy
does not, by any stretch of the imagination, establish an interbranch
supremacy, any more than the President’s more thorough dominance of
his branch establishes an interbranch supremacy over Congress and the
courts.
Article III’s case or controversy limitations also suggest that federal
courts are not definitive diviners of the meaning of the law or the
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
109. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 616 (2000) (“Under our . . . Constitution . . . the limitation of congressional
authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923
(1995) (“[W]e think it inappropriate for a court engaged in constitutional scrutiny to
accord deference to the Justice Department’s interpretation of the Act.”).
110. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. For an inventory of other cases, including a discussion of
how claims of judicial supremacy often coincide with elected branch challenges to judicial
authority, see generally Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998).
111. See Harrison, supra note 76, at 336 (arguing “no court is obliged to treat R
[unconstitutional] statutes as law because no one is so obliged”).
112. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
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Constitution. Federal courts only have jurisdiction over cases or contro-
versies, meaning that they cannot issue Article III judgments or opinions
when they are not deciding cases or controversies. Yet there will be many
situations, many questions, where federal courts cannot opine because
there will be no case or controversy.113 It seems unlikely that the
Constitution makes the judiciary supreme in its exposition yet greatly
constrains its ability to expound. It would be akin to a requirement that
religious acolytes obey a particular leader even though the leader is doc-
trinally incapable of opining on many crucial subjects. The point is that
many constraints on the judiciary’s power to say what the law is are
strange and counterproductive if the judiciary was meant to decide, once
and for all, the meaning of the law, including the Constitution. Someone
crafting a system where the judiciary was meant to definitively determine
the meaning of all laws likely would not have created a constitution that
limited the ability of courts to provide guidance to those in need.
Or consider the same issue from a different perspective, namely the
executive’s ability to preclude judicial review. Suppose a penal statute is
susceptible to two different interpretations, only one of which raises seri-
ous Ex Post Facto Clause issues. If the executive invokes the avoidance
canon114 and chooses the reading that does not raise the constitutional
issue, the executive’s reading of the statute and the Constitution will be
final because the courts will not be able to opine on either.
The executive can even have the final word on pure constitutional
questions. When President Ronald Reagan acquiesced to the OLC con-
clusion that the Constitution never granted a line item veto to the
President,115 the Supreme Court never had a chance to decide the ques-
tion. Indeed, in order to get the matter before any court, Reagan would
have had to exercise a line item veto. We believe that Reagan was right on
the merits and on the absence of an obligation to exercise a line item
veto in order to set up a test case for judicial resolution.
The more general point is that the executive branch regularly
reaches statutory and constitutional conclusions that are final in the sense
that they never find their way into court. This is entirely fitting, for noth-
ing in the Constitution requires the executive to maximize judicial oppor-
tunities to opine. Routine executive finality over a host of statutory and
113. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–89 (1923) (holding taxpayer
lacked standing to challenge federal appropriations).
114. For a discussion of the constitutional avoidance canon, see William K. Kelley,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831,
836–43 (2001); see also Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 76, at 28 R
(“The President must consider the constitutionality of statutes to enforce them, if only to
engage in the uncontroversial practice of construing them when possible in a manner that
avoids constitutional problems.”); Michael T. Crabb, Comment, “The Executive Branch
Shall Construe”: The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing
Statement, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 711, 712 (2008) (arguing President may employ “the
avoidance canon in order to construe a statute to avoid an unconstitutional application”).
115. The President’s Veto Power, 12 Op. O.L.C. 128, 128 (1988).
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constitutional matters sits rather uneasily with any notion that the
Supreme Court is to decide ultimately, via its opinions, what the laws and
Constitution mean.
If the special Supreme Court role referenced in recent Department
of Justice opinions cannot be justified by text or structure, neither can it
be justified by early opinion or practice. The founders never exalted the
Supreme Court as some moderns do. Madison, writing as Publius, ob-
served that, because the departments were “perfectly coordinate,” none
of them could “pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers.”116 What Publius said about
separation of powers applies equally to all constitutional questions—none
can “pretend to an exclusive or superior right” of deciding the
Constitution’s meaning.117
The same skepticism about the role of judicial opinions arises when
looking at early practices. Consider, for example, famous presidential re-
bukes of the Supreme Court. Jefferson never treated William Marbury as
an officer, notwithstanding Marbury v. Madison and its claim that John
Adams had validly appointed Marbury.118 Andrew Jackson vetoed the
Bank Bill despite John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.119
And Abraham Lincoln, in his famous inaugural address, pointedly de-
clared that while Dred Scott decided who won a particular case, its ratio-
nale had no preclusive effect on new cases.120
This approach continues in more recent times. Starting with
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, nearly every President has embraced regula-
tory initiatives and legislative proposals intended to correct perceived
constitutional errors by the Supreme Court.121 In recent memory, Bill
Clinton signed legislation “reversing” Supreme Court religious liberty
decisionmaking;122 Barack Obama not only denounced the Court’s opin-
ion in Citizens United, he did so in front of several Justices.123 These con-
spicuous episodes are part of a healthy interbranch dialogue, one in
which the executive hardly treats the Court’s pronouncements as if they
were the law themselves.
116. The Federalist No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. Id.
118. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803).
119. Veto Message from Andrew Jackson to the Senate, July 10, 1832, in Veto
Messages of the Presidents of the United States with the Action of Congress Thereon,
supra note 104, at 88. R
120. Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, in Addresses of the
Presidents of the United States 133, 138–39 (1989).
121. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution 221 (2004) (listing
Roosevelt’s “court packing proposal, Richard Nixon’s campaign to undo Warren Court
liberalism, Ronald Reagan’s attack on Roe v. Wade, and Bill Clinton’s signing of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act”).
122. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, supra note
9. R
123. See Adam Liptak, A Rare Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
2010, at A12.
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In sum, to imagine that the Constitution marks the Supreme Court
as supreme in its exposition of the Constitution and laws of the United
States, one has to believe two implausible propositions. One has to pre-
sume that a Constitution that never grants the Supreme Court a general
power to decide all legal questions nonetheless cedes the Court a power
to definitively answer such questions in some instances. And one has to
discover, buried deep within the Constitution’s interstices, an inter-
branch supremacy on constitutional and legal interpretation even though
the Constitution contains nary a word hinting at such dominance.
Just to be clear, the President is not above the other branches and he
cannot, in the manner of some autocrat, ignore their lawful decisions. To
the contrary, the President must faithfully execute the constitutional laws
passed by Congress. Likewise, the President must faithfully execute judi-
cial judgments because the power to decide who wins or loses a case rests
with those who wield the judicial power. This obligation to enforce judg-
ments exists as an implication of the separation of executive and judicial
power.124 And finally, we are not denying the constitutionality of judicial
review. When the courts conclude that some statute cannot be applied to
a particular party because it is unconstitutional, the executive cannot ap-
ply that statute to the party. We just deny that in the course of deciding
who wins and loses particular cases the judiciary authoritatively may de-
clare what the law means for all three branches and the nation. While
respect is due to the Supreme Court’s opinions, submission is not.
C. The Faithful Execution Clause and Unconstitutional Laws
The Faithful Execution Clause requires the President to execute the
laws.125 Some believe that this Clause requires the President to enforce
laws and to defend them when someone challenges their constitutional-
ity.126 We disagree. The Faithful Execution Clause does not require the
President to enforce unconstitutional laws or make faithless arguments in
their defense. To see why, we need a better grasp of what constitutes a
law.
It is clear that the Clause does not apply to all actual or putative laws.
The President need not execute the law of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Further, not everything purporting to be federal law is a “law”
124. See generally Baude, Judgment, supra note 84. This implied duty to enforce
judicial judgments does not imply a duty to accept judicial opinions. In standing ready to
execute judicial judgments, the President need not agree with the legal conclusions
underlying them.
125. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. See generally Steven C. Calabresi & Saikrishna
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994) (examining
executive power scholarship and offering “unitary executive” perspective); Saikrishna
Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701 (discussing
President’s power to execute laws). For a discussion of the Faithful Execution Clause and
the President’s law execution power, see id. at 720–26.
126. See generally Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional”
Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative (1998).
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for faithful execution purposes. A text styled as law and passed by the
House, but not by the Senate and not presented to the President, is, de-
spite the label, not federal law. For something to be subject to the execu-
tion duty, it must satisfy Article I, section 7.127
Likewise, for something to be law subject to the execution duty, it
must be substantively proper. Under our constitutional system, federal
and state directives purporting to be law are not law at all when they are
inconsistent with the Constitution. The invalidity of federal laws inconsis-
tent with the Constitution arises from the idea, common at the
Constitution’s founding, that any law, federal or state, inconsistent with
fundamental, higher law is void.128 This was a background assumption, in
the same way that routine executive enforcement of judicial judgments
was an assumption of that era and an implied feature of the Constitution.
Of course, judicial nonenforcement of unconstitutional federal laws
is a longstanding and accepted feature of our Constitution. Even before
Marbury, federal and state courts declared that they would not enforce
unconstitutional laws.129 Federal judges said this even though courts, no
less than the President, have a duty to faithfully execute federal law.130
Indeed, even had the Constitution expressly required the courts to take
care that federal laws be faithfully executed, it is doubtful that such text
would have signaled that the courts had to enforce unconstitutional stat-
utes. Again, to say that one must execute the laws hardly implies that one
must execute anything purporting to be law. Just as the courts may re-
frain from enforcing unconstitutional laws despite their implied obliga-
tion to execute federal law, so too the executive need not enforce those
laws despite his express duty to execute federal laws. In all cases of con-
flict between superior and inferior law, the superior trumps, as Justice
Marshall wrote in Marbury.131
127. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
128. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 887, 933 (2003) (noting state courts in preconstitutional period deemed
statutes to violate fundamental charter without clear textual authority to do so).
129. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.)
(“[I]t is expressly admitted by all this bar . . . that the Supreme Court can declare an act of
congress to be unconstitutional . . . .”); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175
(1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating because legislation was constitutional “it is
unnecessary . . . to determine whether this Court constitutionally possesses the power to
declare an act of congress [unconstitutional]”); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 304, 308 (1795) (opinion of Patterson, J.) (“Whatever may be the case in other
countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is absolutely void.”); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792)
(discussing Circuit Court of New York’s finding that law was unconstitutional).
130. The judiciary executes the law, albeit in a manner different than the executive.
See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 99, at 34 (comments of R
James Madison) (“There was an analogy between the Executive & Judiciary departments in
several respects. The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in others.
The former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others.”).
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–78 (1803).
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The absence of a duty to enforce laws that the President believes are
unconstitutional is in keeping with the country’s earliest practices.
Americans regarded unconstitutional laws as nullities, not things to be
faithfully executed. That tradition was a legacy of the fight with
Parliament and its laws that regulated commerce with the colonies.
Americans did not say that the Stamp Act and other such laws were con-
stitutional and had to be followed until such time as a court declared
them void; such acts were nullities even before any judicial intervention.
John Adams argued as much before the colonial governor and council of
Massachusetts, encouraging them to defy the Act.132 This conception
flourished after independence and is a legacy of our ratification experi-
ence, with many affirming that unconstitutional federal laws “could not
be enforced” because they were nullities.133
The faithful execution duty did not transform objects that were
widely considered nullities into proper objects of enforcement. Writing as
Publius, James Madison noted that the “success” of a congressional usur-
pation would “depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which
are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts.”134 He meant that
because executives and judges had to execute the laws, both had the op-
portunity to thwart legislative usurpations through inaction, a claim pre-
mised in part on the President’s ability to refuse to enforce unconstitu-
tional statutes notwithstanding his faithful execution duty.135 Thomas
Jefferson agreed with Publius. When refusing to enforce the Sedition Act,
he argued that because “the sedition law was unconstitutional and
null . . . my obligation to execute what was law, involved that of not suffer-
ing rights secured by valid laws, to be prostrated by what was no law.”136
Recognizing the folly of reading the Faithful Execution Clause as re-
quiring the enforcement of all procedurally proper laws, modern DOJ
officials have created a laundry list of exceptions to the duties to enforce
and defend. The duties do not apply when the law is “clearly unconstitu-
132. See 3 John Adams, Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 283 (L.H.
Butterfield ed., 1964) (arguing “Stamp Act was null because unconstitutional”).
133. 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, supra note 21, at 162. R
134. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 116, at 286 (James Madison). R
135. As noted, James Wilson similarly declared that the President could shield himself
and avoid executing unconstitutional laws. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
Given that Pennsylvania had a precursor of the Faithful Execution Clause, his claim is
especially illuminating.
136. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), in 9 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 22, at 253, 254; see also Letter from Thomas R
Jefferson to Edward Livingston, supra note 22, at 57 n.1 (noting Sedition Act was a “nullity” R
and had no bearing on his duty to have the “laws executed”).
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tional,”137 is “transparently invalid,”138 or meets some similar standard;
the Clause does not apply when the executive believes that the law en-
croaches upon presidential powers;139 and the faithful execution duty
does not apply, and the executive need not enforce or defend, when up-
holding the law would require the Supreme Court to overturn its
precedents.140
These arguments reflect wishful thinking, taking no account of the
Clause’s text. Either the Clause applies to all procedurally proper laws, no
matter their constitutionality, subject matter, or consonance with judicial
precedent, or it applies to none. There is no textual warrant for saying
that clearly unconstitutional laws are not laws for purposes of the Clause,
but that statutes merely more likely than not unconstitutional are laws
within the meaning of the Clause. Nor is there any basis for imagining
that there is a separation of powers exception in the Faithful Execution
Clause. Furthermore, there is nothing suggesting that whether something
is a law for purposes of the Clause turns on Supreme Court precedent.
Something is, or is not, law, regardless of what the Court may say in its
opinions.
Finally, the Constitution never bifurcates the duty to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, generally requiring the executive to en-
force laws but authorizing him to decline to defend them in some cases.
When the President believes a law is unconstitutional, the Faithful
Execution Clause imposes neither a duty to enforce nor a duty to defend.
But even if that view is mistaken, a reading of the Faithful Execution
Clause does not yield a duty to defend with some exceptions and a duty to
enforce with even more. Discovering such precious and complicated dis-
tinctions in the Clause is an artifact of a desire to temper what would
otherwise be an absurd policy of enforcing all procedurally proper laws—
a result few, if any, believe is required by, or consistent with, the
Constitution.
D. Arguments Against Our Claim
Here we address two arguments against our claim. First, some claim
that if the President could choose not to enforce laws, he would have the
power to suspend laws, a defunct power associated with the seventeenth-
137. Income Tax—Salaries of President & Fed. Judges, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 489
(1919).
138. The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable
Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 n.1 (1980) (citing Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307, 515 (1967)).
139. Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994).
140. Constitutionality of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to
Consider Cases Relating to Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13, 26 (1982) (noting DOJ need
not defend law “when prior precedent overwhelmingly indicates that the statute is
invalid”).
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century English monarchy.141 The implication is that the President can-
not have a power that the Crown did not have in the eighteenth cen-
tury.142 Second, some assert that presentment is the only stage at which
the President can act on his constitutional misgivings.143 Once a bill be-
comes law, the time for constitutional theorizing on the part of the execu-
tive has passed.
The President’s obligation to leave unconstitutional laws unenforced
is rather different from the seventeenth-century Crown’s discretionary
power to suspend. The former is a duty arising out of the President’s oath
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution while the latter could
be exercised whether or not the Crown believed the law to be consistent
with the English Constitution.144 Just as it is wrong to argue that courts
have a suspending power merely because judges must refuse to enforce
unconstitutional laws, it is equally mistaken to believe that the President
exercises a suspending power when he refuses to enforce unconstitu-
tional laws.
The argument that presentment is the only occasion for the
President to act on his constitutional misgivings about legislative enact-
ments is likewise implausible. To begin with, nothing in the Presentment
Clause145 or anything else in the Constitution declares that the President
can act upon his constitutional scruples only when presented with a bill.
To the contrary, it is obvious that the President can defend the
Constitution by pardoning people convicted under unconstitutional laws,
as Thomas Jefferson did with respect to the Sedition Act. More generally,
the President can use any of his powers to satisfy his presidential oath.
Sometimes inaction, failing to lift a finger to further an unconstitutional
plan, is the best means of defending the Constitution.
Moreover, just as one administration cannot bind its successors to its
policy views, one President cannot bind his successors to his views on the
Constitution.146 In particular, the fact that an earlier President did not
veto a bill that he thought constitutional does not prevent his successors
141. See May, supra note 126, at 16–18 (arguing Take Care Clause draws no R
distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional laws).
142. The intuition is that because the President was evidently meant to be weaker
than the English King, the Constitution should not be read to convey implied powers to
the President that the eighteenth-century English monarchy lacked.
143. See May, supra note 126, at 29–33 (arguing “executive’s right to ignore selected R
parts of a law” is inconsistent with veto power).
144. See F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 302–03 (1908)
(describing suspension power and its relation to dispensing power); Carolyn A. Edie,
Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597–1689,
29 Am. J. Legal Hist. 197, 198 (1985) (discussing contours of dispensing power).
145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
146. See Jeremy Rabkin & Neal Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 203, 206–07 (1987) (arguing one administration cannot use court-approved
consent decrees to bind subsequent administrations to otherwise discretionary policy
choices).
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from both concluding that an existing law is unconstitutional and acting
on that conclusion, as Thomas Jefferson did upon assuming office.147 Just
as a Congress may reject the constitutional wisdom of its predecessors
and just as there is nothing like res judicata for judicial constructions of
the Constitution, there is no such thing as executive estoppel.
Does this mean that the President gets two bites at the constitutional
apple, one at presentment and one at the enforcement stage? Yes. In-
deed, the President gets multiple bites. The President can and should
speak up against unconstitutional legislation even prior to presentment,
in a bid to dissuade its passage by Congress. He can and should veto un-
constitutional legislation. He can press for repeal and decline to enforce,
when his assistance is required for its implementation. And he can par-
don those who violate an unconstitutional statute, including those con-
victed under prior administrations and those who might be prosecuted by
future administrations that might have a different sense of the law’s
constitutionality.
The Constitution establishes a belt, suspender, and rope approach to
its defense, with Congress, the courts, the states, the people, and the
President all having roles to play. Congress should consider the constitu-
tionality of the bills it debates; the courts must do the same when
presented with a claim of unconstitutionality; and the people must decide
whether their agents have been faithful to the Constitution. The fact that
the President has multiple means of defending the Constitution and
thereby satisfying his oath is hardly surprising.
III. THE REALPOLITIK OF THE DUTIES TO ENFORCE AND DEFEND
Parts I and II make clear that the President should independently
interpret the Constitution and enforce and defend only those statutes he
thinks constitutional. He should not subordinate his constitutional vision
to either Congress (by having the Justice Department function as
Congress’s lawyer, defending federal statutes that he thinks unconstitu-
tional) or the courts (by enforcing or defending laws so that the Supreme
Court can issue a definitive ruling).
Furthermore, common sense suggests that Presidents generally will
advance a constitutional vision that expands, not contracts, executive
power. Through expansive interpretations of their powers, Presidents si-
multaneously gain policy advantage and “push[] out the boundaries of
their power.”148 For example, after Congress refused to back either Bill
Clinton’s health-care initiative or George W. Bush’s faith-based initiative,
each bypassed Congress, using Executive Orders.149
147. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (describing Jefferson’s R
termination and prevention of Sedition Act prosecutions).
148. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132, 138 (1999).
149. William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 Presidential Stud. Q.
417, 418, 434–35 (2005).
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Yet there is something of a mystery. Rather than embrace duties that
limit its power to advance its preferred constitutional vision, one would
predict that the executive would embrace theories of executive power
that protect presidential prerogatives. Whatever one thinks of our analysis
of the Constitution, Parts I and II make clear that there is a rather plausi-
ble interpretation of the Constitution that cuts against the duties to en-
force and defend, one advanced by executives from the Constitution’s
beginnings. Why then does the Justice Department embrace a suspect
constitutional theory that, at least superficially, limits presidential prerog-
atives and Justice Department discretion?
The answer lies in the self-interest of the Justice Department. Along
with other neutral-sounding norms and traditions that ostensibly place
limits on the power of the Department, the duties to defend and enforce
hamper efforts by the White House and other actors to impinge upon
DOJ autonomy and power. Furthermore, by embracing the power of fed-
eral courts to authoritatively settle constitutional disputes, the duties to
enforce and defend enhance its special status with those courts, especially
the Supreme Court.
Bureaucratic theory drives our analysis.150 At the DOJ, political ap-
pointees and careerists alike enhance their Department’s autonomy and
their status by embracing the duties to defend and enforce and other
widely shared norms and traditions, customs that aid them in turf wars
with the White House and other departments. At the same time, the duty
is malleable, with vague exceptions that allow Justice Department officials
to further both their own legal policy preferences and the desires of the
White House and Congress.151 This malleability, too, is consistent with
bureaucratic theory. Because “democratic politics” “requires accountabil-
ity” the “best a government executive can do is to minimize,” not elimi-
nate, external control.152
A. The Department of Justice and Bureaucratic Theory
Bureaucratic theory looks to the organization of a government
agency and the interests of the individuals who work there to understand
agency decisionmaking. Agencies with a jurisdictional monopoly, for ex-
ample, “have few or no bureaucratic rivals and a minimum of political
constraints imposed on them by [political] superiors.”153 To perpetuate
150. See generally James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and
Why They Do It (1989) [hereinafter, Wilson, Bureaucracy] (examining wide range of
bureaucracies and providing analysis of agency operations). For an insightful discussion of
the applicability of bureaucratic theory to Solicitor General claims of independence, see
generally John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 799 (1992) [hereinafter
McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics].
151. See infra Part IV (examining DOJ’s use of exception to the duty to defend to
serve its self-interest).
152. Wilson, Bureaucracy, supra note 150, at 188. R
153. Id. at 182.
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such autonomy, agencies protect their turf and their status by fighting
organizations that seek to perform similar tasks, avoiding conflicts with
constituents, and inculcating “a widely shared and approved understand-
ing of the central tasks of the agency.”154
The Department of Justice, like other bureaucracies, seeks to expand
its power by embracing norms that build “reputations for efficacy, for uni-
queness of service, for moral protection, and for expertise.”155 Consider,
for example, the claim that government litigation authority should be
centralized in the Department of Justice.156 The DOJ’s power, prestige,
and ability to recruit top graduates who otherwise would gravitate to the
nation’s leading law firms is linked to its litigation authority, including
the authority to decide what arguments to make in court.
It therefore comes as no surprise that the DOJ has well-rehearsed
arguments on why the national interest is served by its control of litiga-
tion. Agency lawyers, according to the DOJ, are too specialized, too prone
to tunnel vision, and only consider what is best for their agency, overlook-
ing how their arguments affect other agencies.157 Further, because the
DOJ does not appeal all defeats, it focuses its energies on winnable, high
stakes cases, thereby creating “a pool of goodwill and credibility with
courts that enhances the prospects for favorable litigation outcomes.”158
These arguments are certainly overstated. They minimize the bene-
fits of agency expertise and reject middle-ground approaches in which
agency lawyers share litigation authority with the DOJ.159 Whether or not
DOJ arguments for centralized litigation are “myths used to justify [self-
154. Id. (citing Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological
Interpretation 121 (1957)). For Justice Department attorneys, a belief in agency neutrality
and autonomy is critical to their decision to work for the DOJ and not a private law firm.
See infra notes 163–164 (discussing DOJ’s ability to recruit top lawyers). In this way, DOJ R
lawyers are motivated to embrace this vision of the Department. See Christopher H.
Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 Duke L.J. 307,
353–54 (2001)(discussing role of “motivation” in lawyers’ beliefs).
155. Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 353 (2001); see also
Gregory A. Huber, The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality 14 (2007) (arguing agency heads
engage in “strategic neutrality” to pursue policy objectives with limited political
interference).
156. For a summary of DOJ arguments in support of centralized litigation authority,
see generally The Att’y Gen.’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. O.L.C. 47
(1982). For a fuller presentation of DOJ arguments and a critique of those arguments, see
generally Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 558 (2003) [hereinafter Devins & Herz, Uneasy
Case].
157. See Devins & Herz, Uneasy Case, supra note 156, at 570–94 (describing R
justifications for centralized government litigation by DOJ).
158. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice Litigation: Externalizing Costs and
Searching for Subsidies, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1998, at 171, 186.
159. See Devins & Herz, Uneasy Case, supra note 156, at 585 (arguing agency lawyers’ R
in-depth knowledge of substantive issues may trump DOJ attorneys’ generalist courtroom
skills).
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interested] decisions,”160 there is no doubt that the DOJ embraces norms
and traditions that enhance the status and autonomy of the Department
and its attorneys.161 These customs allow the Department and its attor-
neys to see themselves as lawyers for “the United States . . . and not [for]
the particular President who happens to be serving.”162
These norms also play an integral role in DOJ efforts to recruit top
lawyers and maintain its elite status.163 Justice Department lawyers are
willing to trade off some of the income of big firm practice in favor of the
rewards of public service and their expectation of an eventual move to
other high status jobs, including large private sector law firms and the
academy. In this way, the bureaucratic interest of the DOJ (independence
from external influence) is inextricably linked to the personal interest of
DOJ attorneys (associating “with law firms of high reputation”).164 This is
especially true of the Office of Solicitor General and Office of Legal
Counsel. Alumni of these offices include four Supreme Court Justices,
many federal court of appeals judges, partners in the appellate practices
of the nation’s top law firms, and numerous law faculty.165
To summarize: Like other bureaucracies, the Justice Department
wishes to maximize autonomy; specifically, it embraces norms and tradi-
tions that shield it from outside influence and facilitate its desire to main-
tain its status as an elite institution. Below, we show that the DOJ’s duty to
160. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics, supra note 150, at 810. R
161. For quite similar reasons, the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel seeks a monopoly
over the resolution of interagency legal disputes. See infra notes 200–205 and R
accompanying text (discussing ways in which OLC seeks to preserve its monopoly over
interagency legal disputes). For a recent articulation of why the OLC should maintain such
control (rather than allow the President to request multiple legal opinions from affected
agencies), see Walter Dellinger, Meanwhile, at the White House . . . , Slate (June 23, 2011,
3:18 PM), www.slate.com/id/2297410/entry/2297533 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing President Obama’s request for multiple opinions on legality of U.S.
military action in Libya).
162. Solicitors General Panel on the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1171, 1180 (2006) (comments of Walter E. Dellinger).
163. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (1995) (arguing
lawyers “invest considerable resources in reputation-building,” including working for
“prestigious law firms”).
164. Id. at 1108; see also David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments
172–220 (2008) (suggesting high status professionals will leave government employ if they
do not receive intangible, reputational benefits).
165. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1497–1501 (2008)
(linking transformation of Supreme Court bar to exodus of attorneys from Office of the
Solicitor General into private practice); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion
Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical
Prolegomenon, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 375, 422, 424 n.185 (1993) [hereinafter McGinnis,
Opinion Function] (noting around twenty percent of attorneys in OLC become academics
and that heads of OLC are often appointed to courts of appeals and Supreme Court).
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defend enhances its status by limiting political checks and, in so doing,
“minimize[s] the number of rivals and constraints.”166
B. The Duty to Defend and the Office of the Solicitor General
The duty to defend protects the Solicitor General from outside influ-
ence and bolsters the Solicitor General’s ties to the Supreme Court. The
fact that the President dislikes the statute on policy grounds does not
matter. The fact that affected agencies or powerful interest groups think
the statute an abomination does not matter. What matters is the Solicitor
General’s expert sense of Supreme Court case law. By exalting Court-
centered arguments, the duty limits political actors from advancing alter-
native readings that further their constitutional vision. For example, dur-
ing the Reagan Administration, the Solicitor General refused to make
originalist arguments calling for the overturning of Warren and Burger
Court-era precedents.167 In this way, the duty to defend—consistent with
bureaucratic theory—works to limit political interference and buoys the
authority of lawyers (the Solicitor General and his career staff) whose sta-
tus is tied to their expertise in, and control of, precedent-based legal
arguments.168
By making Court-centered arguments, moreover, the duty to defend
strengthens the Solicitor General’s bond to the Supreme Court. First, the
Solicitor General treats Supreme Court precedents as binding. While she
has discretion to interpret these precedents, it is nonetheless true that
the Solicitor General’s Court-centric arguments marginally enhance the
legitimacy and authority of the Supreme Court.169 Second (and relat-
edly), because the Solicitor General defends nearly all laws, the duties
166. Wilson, Bureaucracy, supra note 150, at 188. R
167. See Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution—A Firsthand
Account 64–65 (1991).
168. Fried described originalism as “almost becoming the motto of the Meese Justice
Department.” Id. at 61. And while he never formally claims to have resisted originalist
arguments to protect his turf, it is nonetheless true that political appointees in the Justice
Department thought that Fried should have used originalist arguments to call for the
overruling of disfavored precedent. See McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics, supra note
150, at 803 & n.8 (noting potential “tension between principled fidelity to the R
Administration’s jurisprudential views and achievement of the Administration’s policy
objective in a given case”); see also Fried, supra note 167, at 40–44 (noting his efforts to R
prevent Meese loyalists from putting political pressure on him).
169. Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Supreme Court relies on elected
officials and the American people to accept its decisions. See generally Tom R. Tyler &
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Employment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The
United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 708 (1994)
(“[V]oluntary acceptance . . . [is] the only type of public acceptance . . . on which the
Court formally can rely.”). For this very reason, the Court’s legitimacy is boosted by Court-
centric arguments that embrace the Court as a principled, authoritative decisionmaker.
See id. at 714–24 (discussing Court’s acceptance of legitimacy theory as explanation for
why public complies with judicial directives); id. at 780–99 (discussing survey results
furthering legitimacy theory).
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leave it to the Supreme Court to have the last word on the meaning of the
Constitution and the Court’s precedents. Indeed, one of the Justice
Department’s principal arguments in favor of the duties to enforce and
defend is the idea that Supreme Court resolution of constitutional dis-
putes is an integral feature of our system of checks and balances.170
Third, in the majority of cases in which she refuses to defend a federal
statute, the Solicitor General reaffirms the correctness of Supreme Court
rulings.171 The Solicitor General thereby steers clear of near-certain
defeats and reinforces her special status before the Court.
The duty to defend does not stand alone. The Solicitor General em-
braces several customs designed both to insulate her from political con-
trol and to bolster her relationship with the Supreme Court. The Solicitor
General is not interested simply in winning but in being seen as “an ‘hon-
est broker’ or ‘straight shooter.’”172 For example, in determining
whether to seek certiorari and what position to advance in litigation, the
Solicitor General makes use of a court-like process in which affected
agencies submit written analyses and participate in meetings in which
they “advocate” their position to the Solicitor General.173 By employing a
formal, transparent process, the Solicitor General elevates her status (by
acting as “judge” on interagency disputes) and insulates herself from di-
rect lobbying by affected agencies and other interest groups.174 Moreo-
ver, the Solicitor General engages in self-abnegating behaviors that cut
against Department of Justice victories before lower federal courts. These
include supporting petitions for certiorari in cases in which the govern-
ment won, the disclosure of adverse facts and authority, and, most nota-
bly, confessions of error (where the Solicitor General concludes that the
government’s lower court victory “appears to be a miscarriage of law or
justice”).175 In cases involving the defense of federal statutes, the Solicitor
General often shares with the Court alternative legal theories that cut
against her principal argument.176
These practices both strengthen the Solicitor General’s status before
the Court and bolster claims that the Solicitor General can “ascertain[]
and promot[e] the interests of the United States” by maintaining her mo-
nopoly over Supreme Court litigation.177 For some, these practices speak
to the fact that the Solicitor General is independent of the executive
170. See supra notes 63, 73–74 and accompanying text. R
171. See infra notes 267–275 (documenting that most instances where Solicitor R
General does not defend are straightforward applications of Supreme Court precedent).
172. Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1998, at 83, 97.
173. Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1076–77. R
174. Id. at 1076.
175. Merrill, supra note 172, at 96–98. R
176. See Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1081–82 (highlighting cases in which R
Solicitor General made arguments both for and against constitutionality of legislation).
177. Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor
General, 75 Ind. L.J. 1297, 1313 (2000).
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branch, an office that has no client but, instead, has obligations to the
Supreme Court, to the United States, and to justice.178 Career attorneys,
in particular, embrace the self-abnegating behavior of the office and, with
it, the office’s independence from the White House and its special rela-
tionship with the Court.179 For others, these practices bolster the
Solicitor General’s credibility before the Court—so that the Solicitor
General is a more effective lawyer for the executive branch precisely be-
cause she is more than simply an advocate for the legal policy preferences
of the executive branch.180
Under either scenario (and consistent with bureaucratic theory), the
Solicitor General’s office acts in ways that enhance its autonomy and sta-
tus.181 For example, by making sure that the views of independent agen-
cies are shared with the Court, the Solicitor General cannot be accused of
squelching their voice. In so doing, there is less risk of the independent
agencies acquiring formal legislative authorization to present their
views.182 By acting in ways that reflect a “sense of obligation to the Court
178. For a sampling of these views (from Attorneys General and Solicitors General),
see Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 97–98 (1962) (noting Solicitor General’s sole client
is the United States and expounding on freedom of office); Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth
Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law 17 (1987) (repeating Solicitor General
Frederick Lehman: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts”)); Simone E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor
General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229–30 (1955) (noting Solicitor General’s “chief
business is not to achieve victory but to establish justice”).
179. See Merrill, supra note 172, at 97 (“Virtually every exercise of self-abnegating R
behavior originates with civil service employees—the Assistants to the Solicitor General or
the career deputies.”).
180. For a sampling of this perspective (from Solicitors General and academics who
once worked in the Office of Solicitor General), see Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the
Government: Politics, Polemics and Principle, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 595, 597, 601 (1986)
(describing “reservoir of credibility,” established over time, “on which the incumbent
Solicitor General may draw to his immediate adversarial advantage”); Theodore B. Olson,
The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s Stewardship Through the Example of Rex
E. Lee, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 3, 13 (“[S]uccess in realizing the president’s overall litigation
objectives ultimately depended on [the Solicitor General] preserving [his office’s] special
relationship with the Court.”); Merrill, supra note 172, at 99 (“[I]t may be that tenured R
lawyers are . . . more likely to be steadfast in defense of the presidency than political
appointees will be.”); David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the
United States, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter & Spring 1998, at 165, 172–73 (“The Office
will function best . . . when it seems to the Court that it is seeing the same, familiar Solicitor
General’s Office in every case—preferably, the same . . . Office that it saw when the other
political party was in power.”).
181. By way of contrast, political appointees outside the Solicitor General’s office have
argued that the Solicitor General should see herself as an advocate for the President’s
agenda and, consequently, should be subject to greater political controls. See McGinnis,
Principle Versus Politics, supra note 150, at 800–08. For an excellent discussion of different R
conceptions of the Solicitor General’s role in government, see generally Michael W.
McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1105 (1988).
182. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 255, 271–72 (1994) [hereinafter Devins,
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and to the constitutional system” and distinguish her from “lawyers for
private interests,” the Solicitor General elevates her status above all other
advocates.183 No other advocate can claim the lofty title of “Tenth
Justice.”184
For its part, the Supreme Court reinforces these practices and re-
wards the Solicitor General’s fealty to the Court. It grants around seventy
percent of the certiorari petitions filed by the Solicitor General.185 It
rules in favor of the Solicitor more than seventy percent of the time (in
cases in which the government is a party).186 The Justices frequently
(around twenty-two times a year) ask the Solicitor General’s Office to
share its views on whether to grant certiorari in cases in which the govern-
ment is not a party.187 As a result, the Solicitor General now appears as
party or (more typically) amicus in around three-fourths of all cases.188
The Court, moreover, backs centralization of litigation authority, noting
that the Solicitor General has a “broader view of litigation” than the
“more parochial view” of individual agencies and, consequently that the
government “is apt to fare better if [litigation] decisions are concentrated
in a single official.”189
Supreme Court support of Solicitor General control of government
litigation, along with its general backing, strengthens the Solicitor
General’s status and helps fend off efforts to limit her power. This gives
the Solicitor General a powerful reason to embrace the duty to defend
and other norms that link her special relationship with the Court to her
independence, her ability to present herself as something other than an
advocate for the President.
At the same time, for reasons we detail later, the Solicitor General
cannot fully insulate herself from the White House. To accommodate oc-
Unitariness] (discussing Congress’s grant of Supreme Court litigation authority to Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), a decision precipitated by conflicts between FTC and DOJ
Antitrust Division).
183. Letter from Robert H. Bork, Solicitor Gen., to Simon Lazarus III (Aug. 5, 1975),
in Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
500–01 (1975).
184. Caplan, supra note 178, at 3. R
185. Rebecca Mae Salokar, The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law 25 (1992); see
also Lazarus, supra note 165, at 1493 (estimating Court grants Solicitor General’s certiorari R
petitions “about 70% of the time compared to less than 3–4% for others”).
186. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage:
Implications for the Law, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 391, 422 tbl.1 (2000) (tabulating Supreme
Court outcomes by federal government’s posture in case).
187. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1372 n.247 (2010)
(“During the Roberts Court, the justices have called for the views of the Solicitor General
an average of twenty-two times per Term, up from about fifteen times per Term during the
latter Rehnquist Court.”); see also id. at 1334 n.51 (citing studies finding Court follows
Solicitor General’s recommendations around eighty percent of the time).
188. Id. at 1353–60.
189. Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994).
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casional White House pressure, the duties to enforce and defend are rid-
dled with exceptions.190 Consequently the duties are only marginally
helpful in staving-off efforts by the White House and others to dictate the
content of Solicitor General filings.
C. The Office of Legal Counsel and the Duty to Defend
When it comes to the duty to defend, the Solicitor General has a
potential rival in the Justice Department—the Office of Legal Counsel.
Although the OLC plays no formal role in litigation, it functions as the
government’s chief watchdog on issues that implicate presidential power.
The OLC helps determine whether the government should claim execu-
tive privilege; helps the White House assess the scope of presidential
power on war making and other issues; prepares constitutional analyses
of legislation and, in so doing, facilitates the President’s power to inde-
pendently interpret the Constitution (including the drafting of constitu-
tionally based veto messages or signing statements); and facilitates the
President’s faithful execution of the laws by resolving interagency legal
disputes.191 Like the Solicitor General, the OLC has strong incentives to
protect its authority from rival agencies and, in so doing, enhance its
power and status in government.192 And like the Solicitor General, the
Office of Legal Counsel often pursues this goal by embracing neutral-
sounding principles that ostensibly limit its discretion and, in so doing,
insulate it from other governmental actors.193
Unlike the Solicitor General, however, the Office of Legal Counsel
does not enhance its status by embracing principles that transfer deci-
sionmaking power away from the President and to the courts. Instead,
OLC power is hinged to the presidency and, as such, there is no apparent
benefit to the OLC when the President’s power to interpret the
Constitution is limited in order to facilitate judicial resolution of a legal
190. For instance, the “presidential powers” exception to the duty to defend enables
the Solicitor General to both protect her turf and respond to political pressures from the
White House and advocates of presidential power inside the DOJ. See infra notes 240–243 R
and accompanying text (describing congressional respect for assertion of presidential
powers exception).
191. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, The Attorney General’s Lawyer: Inside the
Meese Justice Department (1992) (discussing personal experiences of Reagan OLC head
Douglas Kmiec); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010) (providing descriptive and normative examination of role of
stare decisis in OLC); Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 Cardozo
L. Rev. 21, 337–524 (1993) (presenting papers focused on function of OLC).
192. See McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at 425–31 (“The tension R
between preserving the [OLC’s] reputation and providing advice that is consonant with
the administration’s objectives is central to understanding how OLC conducts its
assignments.”).
193. See infra notes 204–212 and accompanying text (discussing OLC adherence to R
its precedent and its use of adjudicatory model for resolving interagency disputes).
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dispute (via execution of laws the President thinks unconstitutional and
the Solicitor General’s defense of such laws).194
In the abstract, at least, the OLC seems a rival of sorts to the Solicitor
General. Rather than endorse the duties to enforce and defend, the OLC
presumably would embrace the idea that the President neither has to en-
force nor defend laws that he thinks unconstitutional. This rivalry, as it
turns out, is largely ethereal. Again bureaucratic theory explains why.
Like the Solicitor General, the OLC endeavors to maximize its status and
authority within boundaries set by other political actors. With respect to
the duty to defend, the Solicitor General embraces exceptions to the duty
that are responsive to core OLC interests in protecting the President’s
role in our system of separation of powers.195 Outside of statutes limiting
presidential prerogatives,196 the OLC, as Part I details, generally supports
presidential enforcement—even enforcement of statutes the President is
unwilling to defend in court.197 This position allows the OLC to take into
account political limits on presidential nonenforcement and operates as a
neutral-sounding principle that simultaneously limits OLC discretion and
maintains its high status.198 Attorneys in the OLC, both careerists and
their political supervisors, wish to maintain the OLC’s reputation as being
above politics, in part, because their future career prospects are tied to
it.199
194. The OLC’s mission, in large part, is “to assert and maintain the legitimate powers
and privileges of the President” and, as such, the “separation of powers does seem to be
regarded as the soul of that office’s work.” The Constitutional Separation of Powers
Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 126 (1996); Nelson Lund, Lawyers
and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 17, 39 (1995) [hereinafter Lund,
Lawyers].
195. In making this point, we do not mean to suggest that the attorneys in the Office
of the Solicitor General do not personally believe in the exception governing refusals to
defend federal statutes that implicate presidential power. Our point is simply that there is
no actual rivalry between the OLC and the Solicitor General on this question.
196. See Recommendation that the Dep’t of Justice Not Defend the Constitutionality
of Certain Provisions of the Bankr. Amendments and Fed. Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op.
O.L.C. 183, 194–95 (1984) (opining that President has no duty to enforce statutes that
limit presidential power).
197. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (describing OLC support of R
presidential enforcement). At the same time, the OLC recognizes that the President has
inherent power not to enforce and, on rare occasion, it is appropriate for him to make use
of this power. See The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally
Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 279–80 (1980)(“[I]n rare cases the
Executive’s duty to the constitutional system may require that a statute be challenged.”).
For an inventory of OLC declarations on presidential nonenforcement, see Dawn E.
Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1594 n.141 (2007).
198. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text. R
199. Most notably, by arguing that Presidents should generally enforce laws that they
think unconstitutional, the OLC looks to courts to settle disputes over the constitutionality
of federal legislation. In so doing, the OLC embraces court-centric norms that insulate the
office from political attack and enhance the personal status of OLC attorneys. This is not
to say that OLC lawyers do not personally believe in these norms; OLC attorneys may
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 41 19-MAR-12 16:45
2012] THE INDEFENSIBLE DUTY TO DEFEND 547
In understanding OLC practices, the starting point is the office’s rep-
utation for “principled legal analysis”—a reputation built on its indepen-
dence from political controls and its corresponding ability to recruit top
attorneys.200 Because the OLC settles interagency legal disputes and ad-
vises the White House on the scope of presidential power, “the primary
threats to OLC’s credibility and integrity are likely to be its own clients—
the White House, the Attorney General, and the various departments and
agencies that seek its advice.”201 If the OLC was seen as simply following
White House orders, disappointed agencies would seek White House re-
versals;202 likewise, OLC separation of powers decisions would seem more
like the “whim of individuals than the command of impersonal laws.”203
When resolving interagency legal disputes, the OLC imposes both
procedural and substantive constraints on its decisionmaking. Procedural
constraints include the OLC’s refusal to respond to agency queries about
matters in litigation, its insistence that agencies seeking legal opinions
supply their own opinion on the matter in question, its utilization of an
“adjudicatory” model in which the OLC reviews, and relies solely on, sub-
missions by both sides of an interagency dispute (and in which OLC law-
yers refuse to meet with lawyers or policymakers from other agencies),
and the eventual publication of the OLC opinion resolving the dis-
pute.204 By acting like a court and imposing these procedural constraints,
the OLC acquires its “reputation for legally principled opinions.”205
OLC adherence to its own precedent is a substantive constraint that
likewise limits its discretion, protects it from external interference, and
enhances its status and reputation.206 Like judicial stare decisis, adher-
ence to precedent enhances the OLC’s status as a legal, not political, ac-
temper their belief in presidential review by recognizing the need for judicial resolution of
constitutional disputes.
200. McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at 424. R
201. Morrison, supra note 191, at 1496–97. R
202. See McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at 423 (“Insofar as OLC R
maintains an outstanding reputation for principled legal advice, agencies are more likely
to accept OLC’s resolutions as final . . . .”).
203. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 146 (2007).
204. This process is detailed in McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at R
426–29.
205. Id. at 429; see also Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 437, 495 (1993) (describing OLC’s “tendencies towards quasi-judicial
decision making” as “self-serving”).
206. See Morrison, supra note 191, at 1494 (arguing standard stare decisis values such R
as consistency and predictability in law, efficiency of decisionmaking, and credibility of
decisionmaker apply to OLC); see also Harold Honju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal
Counsel from Itself, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 513, 514 (1993) (stating OLC has developed
norms that “protect its legal judgments from the winds of political pressure and
expediency that buffet its executive branch clients”); Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review,
40 Harv. J. on Legis. 453, 473 (2003) (“The OLC has good strategic reasons for being
reasonably disinterested.”).
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tor.207 Moreover, adherence to precedent shields the OLC from political
attack. “[B]y providing a robust basis for saying ‘no’ to [agencies and
other] clients,” adherence to precedent “helps safeguard OLC’s credibil-
ity and integrity.”208 At the same time, adherence to precedent limits but
does not foreclose OLC efforts to advance its (or the White House’s) le-
gal policy agenda; the OLC may creatively interpret and occasionally
overrule precedent.209
What then of OLC opinions on the President’s duties to enforce and
defend laws? Outside of separation of powers cases, the OLC views presi-
dential enforcement as critical to teeing up a judicial resolution of poten-
tial constitutional challenges to legislation.210 For this very reason, the
OLC—drawing a distinction between the duties to enforce and defend—
backed President Clinton’s decision to enforce but not defend 1996 legis-
lation requiring discharge from the military of all HIV-positive service
members.211 Perhaps more striking, even in the separation of powers
context, the OLC makes court-centric arguments to explain why the
President need neither enforce nor defend, by arguing that sometimes
the only way to create a case or controversy in these disputes is for the
President not to enforce.212
This embrace of court-centric arguments about the duty to enforce
but not defend is superficially counterintuitive but eminently sensible.
While the OLC ostensibly limits presidential power, it does so in ways that
take into account its own interests as well as the respective needs of the
Congress, the President, and court-centric interests within the
Department of Justice. Congress is strongly interested in having its laws
enforced and having the courts resolve any constitutional uncertainties
207. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–68 (1992)
(suggesting overruling of controversial precedent undermines Supreme Court’s
institutional legitimacy).
208. Morrison, supra note 191, at 1497. R
209. See id. at 1484–88 (finding both general adherence to precedent and increasing
willingness of OLC—since advent of Clinton administration—to distinguish or overrule
precedent). In this way, adherence to precedent—like the duty to defend—is a neutral
device that allows for exceptions.
210. For an inventory of cases in which the President enforced but did not defend
federal law, see Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen. to the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 65, at 3–7. R
211. See Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President & Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y
Gen., White House Press Briefing (Feb. 9, 1996), available at http://archives.clinton
presidentialcenter.org/?u=020996-press-briefing-by-quinn-and-dellinger-on-hiv-provision.
htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For additional discussion, see supra notes
64–65 and accompanying text. Arguments in support of President Obama’s decision to R
enforce but not defend the DOMA likewise point to the need for a definitive court ruling
on the statute’s constitutionality. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. R
212. According to a 1994 OLC opinion: “[A] policy of consistent Presidential
enforcement of statutes limiting his power would deny the Supreme Court the opportunity
to review the limitations . . . .” Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional
Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994).
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about them;213 the President is generally more interested in peaceful re-
lations with Congress, the media, and affected agencies than in abstract
constitutional questions.214 By embracing a duty to enforce but not de-
fend, the President can have his cake and eat it too—he can curry favor
with interest groups and others in his coalition by arguing in court that a
disfavored law is unconstitutional, and he can avoid political reprisals by
interest group and lawmaker opponents by enforcing a law he thinks un-
constitutional. The Solicitor General and other court-centric offices in
the Justice Department are interested in strengthening their relationship
with the courts as well as their own statuses and authorities—things tied
to the power of courts adjudicating constitutional disputes.215 And finally,
the OLC benefits: The separation of powers exception to the duty to en-
force honors presidential prerogatives; the fact that the OLC otherwise
rhetorically embraces a duty to enforce facilitates the OLC’s reputation as
being above politics and, perhaps more important, generally protects the
OLC from politically damaging battles over presidential nonenforcement
(where the President would often feel compelled to enforce and, if need
be, disregard OLC nonenforcement recommendations). Moreover, by
embracing a duty to enforce that looks to courts to settle the constitution-
ality of federal legislation, OLC attorneys enhance their personal reputa-
tions.216 In sum, the OLC—consistent with bureaucratic theory—protects
its status and reputation by walking a tightrope between political account-
ability and its interests in defending presidential power.217
D. Congress, the President, and the Duty to Defend
As noted above, DOJ support for the duties to enforce and defend is
also tied to its incentives to simultaneously maintain good relations with
Congress and the White House. Congress can pressure the DOJ via legis-
lation shifting litigation authority, the power of the purse, and the power
to investigate.218 The President can not only redistribute litigation au-
213. See infra notes 220–223 and accompanying text. R
214. For an excellent treatment of how it is that the White House trades off its
abstract commitment to the separation of powers in order to pursue more immediate,
more tangible policy goals, see generally Lund, Lawyers, supra note 194. R
215. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text (discussing Solicitor General’s
interest in duty to defend).
216. In particular, by embracing court-centric norms, OLC attorneys and their
supervisors improve their chances of leaving the OLC for high status jobs at places that
largely embrace court-centric norms—federal judgeships, the legal academy, and elite law
firms. See supra notes 163–165 and accompanying text. R
217. See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text (discussing need for agencies to R
take political constraints into account).
218. For a discussion of legislative grants of independent litigation authority, see
Devins, Unitariness, supra note 182, at 269–80. For a discussion of Roosevelt R
Administration efforts to centralize litigation authority in the DOJ, see Neal Devins,
Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 256–61 (1996)
[hereinafter Devins, New Deal] (reviewing William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court
Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (1995)).
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thority within the executive branch; he can threaten removal, thereby
causing DOJ officials to toe the White House line.219
The DOJ, as bureaucratic theory predicts, must take these risks into
account—maximizing its autonomy and status while also operating within
boundaries set by political actors. By embracing malleable duties to en-
force and defend, the DOJ does just this. The duties to enforce and de-
fend meet the needs of Congress and the White House, thereby shielding
the Department from these political actors as well as agency rivals (who
seek independent litigation authority).
1. Congress. — By enforcing and defending the vast majority of fed-
eral statutes (even those that the President disapproves of), the DOJ bol-
sters its relationship with Congress and shields itself from possible
lawmaker challenges to DOJ litigation authority. This is not because
lawmakers are interested in abstract questions of the balance of power
between Congress, the President, and the Courts.220 Lawmakers, instead,
are interested in individual litigation disputes that speak to their or their
party’s policy agenda.221 Congressional support of the duties to enforce
and defend is largely tied to the fact that DOJ practices generally do not
undermine the legal policy preferences of any lawmaker—whether they
personally support or oppose the statute subject to constitutional chal-
lenge. Lawmakers who back these statutes expect that they will be de-
fended in court. The duties meet their needs: The DOJ will almost always
defend the law; and even if the DOJ does not defend the law, the
President will enforce it to facilitate judicial resolution of the legal dis-
pute. Lawmakers who do not support the law likewise expect that their
views will be presented in court. They, however, do not expect the execu-
tive to block enforcement of the law or the DOJ to refuse to defend the
law.222 In part, the duties to enforce and defend operate as a norm that
shields the Department from such pressure. In part, lawmakers see politi-
219. See McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at 430 (discussing Nixon R
White House efforts to push DOJ to back presidential impoundment authority). In
addition to direct White House intervention, the Attorney General may pursue the
President’s legal policy agenda by overruling either the OLC or the Solicitor General. See
Drew S. Days III, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many
Characters, 83 Ky. L.J. 485, 494–95 (1994–1995) [hereinafter Days, Characters] (discussing
Attorney General’s power over Solicitor General).
220. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending 162–63 (2000)
(tracking declining lawmaker interest in protecting core institutional prerogatives);
William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion 101–02 (2003) (detailing how presidents
expand power at expense of Congress); Moe & Howell, supra note 148, at 144 (explaining R
why lawmakers trade off institutional power of Congress in favor of interests—voters,
political parties—that control their reelection and their status in Congress).
221. See generally Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee
Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737 [hereinafter, Devins,
Party Polarization] (documenting how party polarization contributes to lawmakers trading
off their institutional responsibilities in favor of partisan party objectives).
222. For a discussion of episodes in which Congress pressured DOJ to either enforce
or defend laws, see infra notes 232–238 and accompanying text. R
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cal costs in arguing that the executive should preclude judicial challenges
to federal law by refusing to enforce them.223
Consider, for example, Congress’s response to the Obama
Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend the DOMA. Four
lawmakers commented on the President’s action on either the House or
Senate floor. Of these four, only one lawmaker (House Republican James
Lankford) criticized the President based on the erroneous belief that he
had “unilaterally decide[d] not to enforce the Defense of Marriage
Act.”224 The other three lawmakers (House Democrat Jerry Nadler and
Senate Democrats Diane Feinstein and Patrick Leahy) praised the
President for his decision to enforce but not defend the DOMA.225 Like-
wise, Senate Democrat Kristin Gillibrand praised the President (noting
that the “executive branch’s responsibility to defend federal laws is not
absolute”) in a letter calling on the House Republican leadership to aban-
don its defense of the DOMA.226
While DOMA opponents might have supported the President had he
refused to enforce the statute, it is telling that no lawmaker called for the
President to back up his view that the DOMA is unconstitutional by refus-
ing to enforce the statute. This may reflect institutional norms that
Presidents should not unilaterally settle constitutional challenges to fed-
eral statutes. It may also reflect the fact that today’s Congress is polarized
along party lines and, consequently, lawmakers from the President’s party
will almost always support the President.227 Whatever the explanation,
lawmakers from both parties acquiesce to the President’s enforcement of
federal law—even those laws that his DOJ will not defend in court.
With the notable exception of Watergate-era legislation establishing
an Office of Senate Legal Counsel to defend congressional interests in
separation of powers disputes and requiring the DOJ to notify that office
223. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 221, at 759–62 (discussing increasing R
lawmaker support for judicial resolution of constitutional questions).
224. 157 Cong. Rec. H1400 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (remarks of Rep. James
Lankford).
225. Id. at H1642 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Jerrold Nadler)
(“President Obama is enforcing the law. He is simply not urging it in court. That’s his
prerogative, and that’s his duty if he doesn’t think it’s constitutional.”); id. at S1754 (daily
ed. Mar. 16, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“I applaud President Obama and
Attorney General Holder for making the right decision.”); cf. id. (remarks of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (noting President’s conclusion “that the law violates fundamental constitutional
guarantees of equal protection”).
226. Letter from Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (March 2, 2011), available at http://gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/
press/release/gillibrand-to-house-gop-dont-spend-taxpayer-money-defending-
unconstitutional-doma-law (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
227. See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why
Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 Willamette
L. Rev. 395, 410 (2009) (“When Congress is polarized, members of the President’s party
are not likely to break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives.”).
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when it would not defend federal statutes,228 Congress has generally
steered clear of DOJ enforcement/defense of federal statutes.229 Outside
of confirmation hearings (where Attorney General and Solicitor General
nominees are asked about their willingness to defend statutes at odds
with either their own or the President’s agenda),230 we could only locate
three post-1978 episodes where lawmakers took meaningful aim at the
DOJ’s failure to enforce or defend federal statutes.231 In 1985, House
228. 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006) allows the Senate Legal Counsel, when authorized by
the Senate, to appear in any legal action “in which the powers and responsibilities of
Congress under the Constitution . . . are placed in issue.” See Days, Characters, supra note
219, at 501–03 (discussing these statutory measures as well as Congress’s failure to enact R
legislation creating a congressional general counsel who would represent congressional
interests in court). For additional discussion, see Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House
Counsel Office: Dilemmas in Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1998, at 47, 47–48.
229. That is not to say that lawmakers never express their views on issues of DOJ
representation. Congress, for example, has held hearings about Clinton DOJ arguments in
religious liberty cases and about White House and interest group efforts to pressure the
Reagan Office of Solicitor General to advance the President’s legal policy agenda on
abortion, affirmative action, and other issues. See Department of Justice Oversight,
Hearing on the Activities of the Department of Justice Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 3–4, 26–28 (1994) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (challenging
Clinton Administration’s interpretation of Religious Freedom Act); Solicitor General’s
Office: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2 (1987) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (noting
charge that “essential intellectual independence of the [Solicitor General’s] Office is being
compromised . . . has been made on a number of occasions during the past several years”).
On occasion, moreover, Congress grants litigation authority outside the Justice
Department—typically to independent agencies. See Devins, Unitariness, supra note 182, R
at 263–80 (chronicling legislative grants of independent litigating authority). For the most
part, however, lawmakers have little interest in overseeing the DOJ’s near-monopoly on
executive branch litigation. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was:
Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Winter 1998, at 205, 206 (arguing “distribution of litigation authority among executive
branch agencies and departments is of marginal consequence to Congress”).
230. Here is a sampling of lawmaker efforts to jawbone either the Attorney General
designee or Solicitor General designee to defend federal statutes supported by that
lawmaker: Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Ashcroft to be Attorney
General of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
141 (2001) (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. nominee) (discussing willingness
to defend prospective legislation that he opposed); Confirmation Hearing on the
Nominations of Larry D. Thompson to be Deputy Attorney General and Theodore B.
Olson to be Solicitor General of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 125–33 (2001) (statement of Theodore B. Olson) (discussing duty
to defend in general and campaign finance laws in particular); Nomination of Seth
Waxman to be Solicitor General, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 98–102 (1997) (statement of Seth Waxman) (discussing willingness to defend
restrictions on habeas corpus, Miranda-override legislation, and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).
231. In addition to these three episodes, lawmakers have asked the DOJ to provide
Congress with information (typically through a letter) about DOJ claims that it can refuse
to defend a federal statute. See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Hon.
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 65 R
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Democrats and Senate Republicans registered their disapproval of an
OLC opinion advising executive agencies to neither enforce nor defend a
federal contracting law.232 Lawmakers vehemently opposed the
President’s refusal to implement the law by holding numerous hearings,
issuing committee reports, and threatening to cut off executive branch
procurement funds.233 In 1993, Clinton Solicitor General Drew Days re-
versed the position of the Bush I Administration by refusing to defend a
1984 child pornography statute in a case before the Supreme Court, argu-
ing that the statute was unconstitutional and that the conviction of
Stephen Knox for possession of child pornography should be vacated.234
Congress struck back; all one hundred senators voted for a resolution
condemning the Solicitor General’s brief and a 1994 crime bill included
a section expressing Congress’s support for the 1984 law.235 In 1999,
Senate Republicans held hearings to examine the DOJ’s refusal to en-
(responding to February 21, 1996 letter from Hatch regarding Department of Justice
decision to enforce but not defend federal legislation requiring dismissal of HIV-positive
members from military service); Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce
Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275 (1980) (reprinting July
30, 1980 letter from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to Senator Max Baucus,
Chairman of Senate Subcommittee on Limitations of Contracted and Delegated Authority,
responding to request for information regarding Carter Justice Department decision not
to defend speech limitations in Public Broadcasting Act of 1967). The Reagan DOJ
rejected this conclusion and did defend the Broadcasting Act. See Ira L. Strauber,
Neglected Policies: Constitutional Law and Legal Commentary as Civic Education 72
(2002) (describing Administration’s decision to defend). For additional discussion see
infra notes 267–269 and accompanying text (providing examples of DOJ’s refusal to R
defend federal statutes).
232. See Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice Memorandum on the
Constitutionality of the Bid Protest Provisions in CICA, 42 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 755
(1984) (expressing DOJ opinion that law posed serious constitutional problems).
233. The law allowed disappointed bidders to lodge protests with a government
official outside the executive branch, the Comptroller General. In so doing, the OLC
claimed that the law impermissibly vested executive power in the Comptroller General. For
descriptions of this dispute, see Kmiec, supra note 191, at 54 (describing OLC’s R
examination of law and determination of its unconstitutionality); Geoffrey P. Miller, From
Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 401, 418–21 (1989) (describing executive nonenforcement and congressional
response). For a detailing of lawmaker objections, see House Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
The President’s Suspension of the Competition in Contracting Act Is Unconstitutional,
Report of the House Committee on Government Operations, H.R. Rep. No. 98-138 (1985).
234. Brief for the United States at 8–9, Knox v. United States, 508 U.S. 959 (1993)
(No. 92-1183).
235. Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 160003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (codified at note appended to 18 USC § 2252 (2006)). The
focus of the dispute was whether the child pornography law applied to girls dressed in
scanty apparel. The George H.W. Bush Administration had successfully argued that the law
applied to such photos. Clinton Solicitor General Drew Days said it did not and, after the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, “confess[ed] error” to the Court. For Days’s
account of this dispute, see Drew S. Days, III, When the President Says “No”: A Few
Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J.
App. Prac. & Process 509, 514–17 (2001) [hereinafter Days, A Few Thoughts] (describing
Days’s role in briefing Knox).
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force and defend 1968 legislation that sought to statutorily nullify
Miranda v. Arizona.236 For its part, the DOJ largely acquiesced to Congress
in these disputes. It backed away from its nonenforcement/nondefense
in the contracting law dispute.237 And the President and Attorney Gen-
eral not only disavowed the Solicitor General’s confession of error in the
1993 child pornography case, the Attorney General also took control of
the case and offered a defense.238
The infrequency of these episodes and the fact that Congress has not
meaningfully considered the larger question of DOJ enforcement and de-
fense of federal statutes is striking. It speaks to the facts that Congress
generally accepts DOJ practices and that lawmakers are much more inter-
ested in their own reelection and the policy goals of their parties than
they are in collective goods implicating “the institutional power of
Congress.”239 With the exception of the 1985 bid protest dispute, none of
these episodes implicated broader questions of congressional power (and
that dispute focused much more on the failure to enforce than the failure
to defend).240 More generally, Congress has made clear that the
President need not defend federal statutes that implicate presidential
power. When creating the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, lawmakers did
not question that DOJ position; their focus, instead, was on creating a
mechanism by which Congress could participate in these disputes.241
236. See The Clinton Justice Department’s Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary
Confessions: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (1999). In addition to these hearings, lawmakers used
departmental oversight hearings to ask Attorney General Reno and Solicitor General Days
about the DOJ’s willingness to defend Miranda-override legislation. See Oversight of the
Department of Justice: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 9–11
(1999) (memorializing exchange between Senator Strom Thurmond and Attorney
General Janet Reno); Solicitor General Oversight: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 29–33 (1995) (describing exchange between Senator Fred
Thompson and Solicitor General Drew Days). After the DOJ announced that it would not
defend the statute, moreover, Solicitor General Waxman was asked to explain the
Administration’s decision. Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1073. R
237. See Myron Struck, Meese Averts Showdown on GAO Contract Power, Wash. Post,
June 5, 1985, at A21. In litigation regarding this provision, the Solicitor General—in the
wake of congressional amendments to the contested provisions—abandoned his challenge
to the statute’s constitutionality. See Miller, supra note 233, at 420. R
238. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Demagoging Kidporn: Justice Gets Bad Rap, Legal Times,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 26 (quoting Clinton letter); Pierre Thomas, Reno Takes Tougher Stance
on Child Pornography, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1994, at A3 (reporting Attorney General
“overruled [Solicitor General] and took the somewhat unusual position of signing the
brief herself”). By overriding the Solicitor General, the Attorney General took personal
control of the litigation—so that the DOJ formally defended the 1984 statute. For
additional discussion, see Days, A Few Thoughts, supra note 235, at 514–17.
239. Moe & Howell, supra note 148, at 144. R
240. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text (describing congressional R
opposition to executive refusal to enforce or defend federal contracting law).
241. The Senate Legal Counsel is required to “defend vigorously” the constitutionality
of federal legislation. 2 U.S.C. § 288h (2006). Hearings and floor statements about the
creation of this office did not question the propriety of the DOJ’s refusal to defend
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 49 19-MAR-12 16:45
2012] THE INDEFENSIBLE DUTY TO DEFEND 555
More generally, lawmakers are accepting of presidential decisions to en-
force but not defend federal statutes.242 What matters is that the statute
will be defended in court—not that the DOJ defends the law. This helps
explain why lawmakers vehemently resisted Clinton DOJ efforts to short
circuit Supreme Court resolution of a constitutional challenge to a fed-
eral antipornography statute but acquiesced to President Obama’s deci-
sion to enforce but not defend DOMA.243
Though Congress possesses significant weapons to curb the DOJ, it
has placed few constraints on DOJ autonomy. Ironically, the constraints
that Congress does impose on the DOJ largely inure to the latter’s bene-
fit. In particular, by calling on the DOJ to either enforce or defend fed-
eral laws, Congress embraces the very court-centric norms that enhance
the autonomy and status of the DOJ. At the same time, by hardly ever
resisting the DOJ’s refusal to defend, Congress cedes the Solicitor
General the latitude to both be an advocate for presidential power and to
advance the President’s constitutional vision.
2. The White House. — The White House gains much and loses little
by having the DOJ defend nearly all federal statutes that do not implicate
presidential power. By signaling that the DOJ generally will advance con-
gressional preferences, the duty to defend furthers White House inter-
ests. First, the duty helps preserve DOJ control of government litigation,
something the White House strongly favors. Second, general adherence
perceived encroachments on presidential power. Instead, lawmakers acknowledged a
“conflict of interest” between the DOJ and Congress. See, e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. 2961–65
(1977) (statement of Sen. Abourezk) (calling for creation of Office of Senate Counsel, in
part to address legitimate conflict of interest between DOJ and Congress on presidential
power disputes).
242. In the post-1978 period, we could identify only two cases in which the executive
refused to enforce or defend federal statutes (outside the separation of powers context). In
both of these cases, there was no legislative support for the statutory provision in question
and, indeed, there is reason to think that both of these provisions were mistakenly
included in the legislation. In both cases, the executive’s announcement that it would
neither enforce nor defend met no congressional opposition. In 1996, Congress included
a provision in a telecommunications law that seemingly made internet communications
concerning abortion a felony. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 507(a), 110 Stat. 56, 137 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C § 1462 (2006)). The inclusion
of this provision, apparently, was an error; its author, Henry Hyde, attributed it to “bad
staff work” and claimed that nothing in his amendment should be “interpreted to inhibit
free speech about the topic of abortion.” John Schwartz, Abortion Issue Makes Its Way into
Telecom Law, Seattle Times, Feb. 9, 1996, at A3.
In 1997, Congress enacted a law that held attorneys criminally liable for helping
elderly citizens qualify for Medicaid by transferring property. Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4734, 111 Stat. 251, 522–23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6)
(2006)). According to a law review account, “[t]he fact that there was no advocate for its
passage, no legislative history, no hearings, no reports, no comments, and no discussion of
its merits lends credence to the inference that it may have been a legislative oversight.” Jim
Wayne Chidress, Medicaid and Estate Recovery Issues, 1 Appalachian J.L. 75, 83 (2002).
243. Compare supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text (discussing reaction to R
Obama decision), with supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text (detailing reaction to R
Clinton decision).
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to the duties to enforce and defend symbolizes the President’s willingness
to operate within boundaries that some believe arise from our system of
checks and balances,244 insulating him from charges that he is imperial.
Third, generally honoring the duties helps to legitimize those rare in-
stances where the President decides not to enforce or defend.245 As com-
pared to these benefits, the costs are minimal. Exceptions to the duty to
defend provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the limited constitu-
tional agenda of Presidents, meaning that the duties are not terribly con-
straining in practice.
To start, Presidents strongly back DOJ centralization of litigation
and, consequently, support practices—like the duty to defend—that
shield the DOJ from rivals who would otherwise seek to have Congress
decentralize litigation authority. Consider, for example, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s efforts to centralize litigation authority in the DOJ and thus
strengthen his hold on the burgeoning administrative state.246
By backing the court-centric duties to enforce and defend, moreo-
ver, the President facilitates DOJ efforts to bolster its special relationship
with the Supreme Court. The President typically benefits from this rela-
tionship because he and his Solicitor General generally will see eye-to-eye
on constitutional issues.247 Through the President’s power to appoint, it
is likely that the Solicitor General will have views generally simpatico with
the White House. Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried put it this way:
“I was chosen as Solicitor General not because the President had a view
and a policy about all of the detailed and technical matters I would have
to deal with, but because [my views were in sync with his] general disposi-
tion about the law . . . .”248
Presidential acquiescence to the duties to enforce and defend is also
a byproduct of the fact that there are next-to-no cases where adherence to
the duties undermines the President’s constitutional agenda.249 Although
244. See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text (discussing views of Clinton and R
Obama Administrations).
245. See McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 165, at 424 (noting President wants R
his “legal views to have force” and perceived politicization of DOJ might result in the
“discount[ing]” of those views). For examples of the President participating in Supreme
Court litigation, see infra notes 251–252 and accompanying text (discussing involvement R
of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton).
246. Devins, New Deal, supra note 218, at 256–61. R
247. For a sampling of arguments linking Solicitor General independence to Solicitor
General advocacy on behalf of the President, see supra note 180; see also infra note 248 R
and accompanying text (citing Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried as example).
248. Fried, supra note 167, at 191. R
249. Indeed, Presidents generally support judicial supremacy—either because Court
rulings match presidential preferences or (when Court rulings are at odds with his
preferences) because the President may need to reach out to lawmakers, voters, and other
constituencies that support the Court. This is the central point of Keith E. Whittington,
The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and
Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 284 (2007) (“Hemmed in by conflicting
commitments and demands, presidents have ceded ground to the justices.”).
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Presidents have a general interest in presidential power and may have
specific interests on issues like abortion, affirmative action, and gay
rights, they rarely have strong feelings about most constitutional dis-
putes.250 Outside of a handful of high-visibility cases, the White House
leaves it to the Solicitor General and Attorney General to manage the
President’s legal policy agenda. Instances where the White House either
communicates its legal policy preferences to the DOJ or otherwise partici-
pates in the drafting of Supreme Court filings are few and far between.251
Instances where the President personally intervenes and orders the DOJ
to reverse its position are extremely rare and highly visible. Examples in-
250. Even when Presidents have staked out a legal policy position, it is often the case
that that principle is honored more in the breach than in the observance. For example, as
Nelson Lund documents, while the first Bush Administration made “the defense of the
presidency” a priority, it also regularly traded off this priority to pursue more “immediate
and tangible” policy goals. Lund, Lawyers, supra note 194, at 35. In a separation of powers R
dispute involving the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, the administration did
not challenge federal legislation that transferred operating control and financial
responsibility for Washington area airports away from the Department of Transportation
and to a newly created entity whose board of review “would be members of Congress
appointed by the new state operating authority from a list of names submitted by the
congressional leadership.” Id. at 71. Perhaps more striking, the administration never
challenged Congress’s power to authorize qui tam actions—lawsuits by private “attorneys
general” who receive a cash bounty for enforcing federal laws. See Ara Lovitt, Note,
Fighting for Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and the President, 49 Stan. L. Rev.
853, 863–64 (1997) (discussing relative silence of executive branch on qui tam suits). This
episode was especially striking because the Solicitor General and the White House largely
ignored a Bush Office of Legal Counsel opinion strongly challenging the constitutionality
of qui tams. See id. at 863 (arguing OLC memo “did not represent the government’s
official litigating position”).
251. In his essay When the President Says “No”: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power
and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, Clinton Solicitor General Drew Days
discusses instances where the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and (first term) Clinton White
Houses sought to influence Solicitor General filings. Days, A Few Thoughts, supra note
235, at 520 (concluding direct Presidential intervention is “so notable” because of its R
rarity). Days is able to identify five cases, only one of which directly involved the duty to
defend. Id. at 510–19 (identifying Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Commc’n Workers of Am. v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993); Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996)). Other prominent examples
include Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Truman), Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (Eisenhower), New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(Nixon), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Ford), INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(Reagan), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (George W. Bush). See Joseph A.
Califano, Governing America 231–43 (1981) (discussing Bakke); William French Smith,
Law and Justice in the Reagan Administration 218–21 (1991) (discussing Chadha); Devins,
Unitariness, supra note 182, at 284–85 (discussing Shelly, Brown, and New York Times); R
Howard Fineman & Tamara Lipper, Spinning Race, Newsweek, Jan. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/62910 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
Grutter). Of these six cases, two involved the separation of powers exception to the duty to
defend (Buckley and Chadha). No doubt, there are more examples. At the same time, the
fact that there are next-to-no documented examples of direct White House participation is
telling.
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clude Reagan’s intervention in a lawsuit involving tax breaks for racially
discriminatory schools, George H.W. Bush’s participation in a dispute
over the desegregation of traditionally black colleges, and Clinton’s in-
volvement in a lawsuit involving federal enforcement of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.252
By highlighting the infrequency of presidential communications and
interventions, we do not mean to suggest that the DOJ is a near-perfect
mirror of the President’s legal agenda. Likewise, the fact that Presidents
generally have not sought to override DOJ decisions to defend federal
statutes does not mean that Presidents embraces these defenses.253 Our
point, instead, is that the duty to defend rarely implicates issues on which
the President has strong personal feelings. Rather than pick fights with
Congress or interest groups over the nondefense of federal statutes, the
President is more interested in placating Congress and protecting DOJ
control of litigation and the Solicitor General’s special relationship with
the Supreme Court. Indeed, the only presidential interventions in duty to
defend cases involve cases where the President disapproves of either the
Solicitor General’s refusal to defend a federal statute or its failure to de-
fend as vigorously as the President would like.254
Finally, the President benefits from the duties to enforce and defend
in other, less visible ways. By insulating the DOJ from presidential con-
trol, the duty to defend allows the President to seek cover behind a DOJ
252. In all three cases (none of which directly involves the defense of federal
legislation), the President had been directly lobbied by interest groups of congressional
leadership. See Caplan, supra note 178, at 56 (discussing influential House Republican R
Trent Lott’s lobbying of President Reagan in tax breaks case); Days, A Few Thoughts, supra
note 235, at 518 (discussing Clinton’s decision—after meeting with religious interest R
groups—to have DOJ argue religious liberty interests were infringed upon in case where
DOJ had previously argued there was no substantial burden on religion); Lund, Lawyers,
supra note 194, at 76 n.171 (noting George H.W. Bush’s decision on traditionally black R
colleges followed in wake of his meeting with “representatives of interests materially
affected”); Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 1991, at B6 (discussing President George H.W. Bush’s response to leading
black educators).
253. See Lund, Lawyers, supra note 194, at 70–79 (noting disjunction between R
George H.W. Bush Administration’s embrace of presidential power and DOJ litigation
strategy in Airports dispute, discussed supra note 250); see also supra note 250 (discussing R
George H.W. Bush’s defense of federal qui tam statute).
254. See Department of Justice Oversight, Hearing on the Activities of the
Department of Justice Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 11 (1994)
(statement of Solicitor Gen. Drew S. Days) (discussing Clinton’s ordering Solicitor General
to more vigorously enforce Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)); supra notes
235–238 and accompanying text (discussing President Clinton’s disapproval of Solicitor R
General’s confession of error in Knox, a 1994 child pornography case). In expressing
disapproval of Solicitor General decisionmaking in these cases, the President responded to
lawmaker pressure (in the child pornography case) and interest group pressure (in the
RFRA case). See supra notes 235–238 (discussing child pornography case); supra note 252 R
(discussing RFRA case). In other words, Presidents may trade off the presidential power to
independently interpret the Constitution for more immediate political rewards. In Part V,
we consider this question.
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that largely agrees with him. The President can claim that DOJ indepen-
dence legitimizes its support for Presidential legal claims. Correspond-
ingly by signaling his willingness to be bound by DOJ interpretations of
the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, the duties to enforce
and defend help combat allegations of presidential imperialism.
At the same time, as we discuss in Part IV, exceptions to the duty to
defend generally allow for a meshing of a President’s constitutional vision
and the DOJ’s purported responsibility to defend federal statutes. There
is no duty in separation of powers cases;255 likewise, there is no duty in
cases where the DOJ claims that the statute is at odds with Supreme Court
precedent.
IV. THE DUTY TO DEFEND IN PRACTICE: HOW THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
FITFULLY ADVANCES THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
VIA EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY TO DEFEND
Throughout this Article, we cast doubt on the constitutionality and
efficacy of the so-called duty to defend. Part I identifies dramatic differ-
ences in approaches from administration to administration—so much so
that it is impossible to articulate the precise contours of the duty. New
configurations pop up as the need arises. Part II argues that the court-
centric duty to defend has no place in our constitutional scheme. The
President need not subordinate himself to the judiciary’s sense of the
Constitution. Part II also casts doubt on the many exceptions to the duty
to defend, such as the convenient but suspect presidential powers excep-
tion. Part III offers an alternative explanation for the duty, namely, the
self-interest of the DOJ. The duty to defend is a classic example of an
agency embracing neutral principles that shield it from political attack
and maximize its status.
This Part tests the claims of Part III. By examining instances where
the DOJ refuses to defend federal statutes, we show that the duty is imple-
mented in ways that speak more to DOJ self-interest than to the
President’s supposed obligation to defend laws he thinks unconstitu-
tional.256 In particular, as Part III suggests, the DOJ implements the duty
255. This does not mean that the DOJ will always challenge statutes that limit
presidential prerogatives. See supra note 250 (discussing Airports dispute and qui tam R
cases).
256. While we think our proof is conclusive, we recognize the limits of our
methodology. In particular, by paying attention to instances where the DOJ does not
defend federal statutes, we make no effort to identify cases in which the DOJ and/or
President thinks a law unconstitutional but nevertheless defends it. There are two reasons
we do not consider such cases. First, one would have to identify the President’s
constitutional agenda, a difficult task, and whether the President or even the Solicitor
General was aware that the statute ran afoul of that agenda, a near-impossible endeavor.
Second, even if the President is personally aware of the case and even if the DOJ thinks
that the statute is clearly unconstitutional, the DOJ may defend the statute for political
reasons. For example, there is reason to question Clinton Solicitor General Seth Waxman’s
account of his decision to defend Communications Decency Act (CDA) provisions that
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 54 19-MAR-12 16:45
560 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:507
to defend in ways that simultaneously (1) embrace a court-centric focus
that strengthens ties between the courts and the DOJ; (2) allow it to take
an assertive view of presidential power in separation of powers cases; and
(3) outside of separation of powers cases, allow significant wiggle room so
the President and the DOJ can advance their limited constitutional
agendas.257
More than anything, our discussion highlights the breadth of the ex-
ceptions to the duty to defend. Without these exceptions, the duty to
defend would have been abandoned long ago, for political reasons. The
Obama Administration’s recasting of the duty to defend in the DOMA
case highlights the need for the DOJ to provide the President with suffi-
cient discretion to advance his limited constitutional vision.258 As the bal-
ance of this Part shows, this recasting typifies DOJ practices: The DOJ
speaks of the duty to defend to justify decisions that serve its self-interest,
typically to explain why its failure to defend a law fits within one or an-
other exception to the duty.
Modern DOJ statements about the duty to defend typically recognize
two exceptions. One exception is in cases that implicate presidential
imposed criminal penalties on “indecent” speech available to children on the internet. See
Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1079 (arguing DOJ’s brief articulated “the strongest R
possible rationale in support of constitutionality”). For Waxman, his CDA defense, while
an “example some people chuckle to recall,” exemplifies the willingness of the Solicitor
General to defend constitutionally suspect statutes. Id. Yet there is reason to think that
Waxman defended the CDA not because he believed reasonable arguments could be made
in its defense but, in large part, because Congress and the Clinton White House had
rebuked Solicitor General Drew Days for failing to defend a child pornography statute in
the Knox case. See supra notes 234–238 and accompanying text. For additional discussion, R
see Neal Devins, Politics and Principle: An Alternative Take on Seth P. Waxman’s Defending
Congress, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2061, 2066–67 (2003) [hereinafter Devins, Alternative Take]
(arguing Waxman may have defended CDA to avoid political backlash).
257. In this Part, the analysis is limited to evidence that the duty to defend is
implemented in ways that allow the DOJ and the President to advance their constitutional
agendas. This Article does not analyze the President’s implementation of the duty to
enforce and, with it, the interface of the two duties. The reason for this is that there is
simply no way to catalog instances where the President does not enforce a law or to isolate
instances where constitutional concerns figure into the President’s calculation. First,
executive agencies have finite budgets and cannot implement all enacted legislation.
Hence, the failure to enforce could result from resource allocation decisions rather than
be grounded in the Constitution. For example, Attorney General Holder claimed that
“scarce enforcement resources” explained his decision to end raids on distributors of
medical marijuana. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids
on Medical Marijuana Dispensers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at A20. Second, unlike the
duty to defend, there is no regular mechanism by which the President alerts Congress of
instances in which he will not enforce laws for constitutional reasons. Obviously, the
absence of such reporting makes an examination of nonenforcement on constitutional
grounds much more difficult.
258. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text (discussing Obama Attorney R
General Holder’s recasting of the duty); see also infra notes 293–301 (discussing internal R
contradictions in Obama Administration regarding DOMA announcement).
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power.259 The second exception is court-centric, focusing on instances
where the federal statute is sharply at odds with Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.260 Under the DOJ’s standard account, the Solicitor General would
not refuse to defend a statute merely because the President’s constitu-
tional jurisprudence could not be squared with the statute. Yet this stan-
dard account is untrue: In addition to the two generally recognized ex-
ceptions, there is a third exception, namely, instances where either the
White House or the DOJ does not wish to defend the constitutionality of
legislation. With the possible exception of Attorney General Holder’s let-
ter on the DOMA, the DOJ does not formally recognize this exception.261
Instead, if it says anything at all, it struggles to fit those cases into the
exception for clearly unconstitutional legislation.
From December 1975 to May 2011, according to an inventory of
communications from the DOJ to Congress regarding the defense of fed-
eral statutes,262 the DOJ sent one hundred and six communications to
Congress, ninety-six of which concerned its refusal to defend federal stat-
utes.263 These ninety-six communications (because some statutory provi-
sions are the subject of more than one communication) concerned
seventy-five different statutory provisions. Fourteen of these provisions
implicate the separation of powers exception;264 the remaining sixty-one
arguably fit into the clearly unconstitutional exception to the duty. Of
these sixty-one, seven received substantial news coverage.265 We are aware
of two other cases, omitted from the DOJ list, which implicated the duty
to defend and received substantial news coverage.266 We focus on these
259. See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text (discussing presidential power R
exception).
260. See Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1084–87 (discussing court-focused R
exception).
261. See supra Part I (discussing duty and its variants). For additional discussion of
the DOMA letter, see infra notes 293–301 and accompanying text (highlighting how duty R
to defend obfuscates more than illuminates President’s constitutional vision).
262. This inventory is maintained by the Senate Legal Counsel. See Communications
and Memoranda on the Defense of Acts of Congress [hereinafter Senate List] (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
263. See Memorandum from Brian Kelley to Neal Devins (July 7, 2011) [hereinafter
Kelley Memo] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing and categorizing
communications between DOJ and Congress).
264. Most cases in which the DOJ invoked the separation of powers exception were
highly visible. Ten of these fourteen cases received substantial press treatment, including
the independent counsel statute, the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act, and the
Competition in Contracting Act. Id.; see also supra notes 232–233, 237 and accompanying R
text (discussing congressional opposition to President’s refusal to enforce Competition in
Contracting Act).
265. In identifying cases that received major news coverage, our research assistant
Brian Kelley did a variety of keyword searches using the LexisNexis “Major Newspapers”
database. See Kelley Memo, supra note 263. R
266. These cases are Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and Knox
v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993). For an explanation of why these cases were not
included on the list, see infra notes 279, 291. R
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nine cases. These high-visibility cases are more likely to draw attention
from lawmakers, are more likely to trigger White House interest, and, as
such, are more likely to implicate the executive’s constitutional vision.
Before turning to these nine cases, here is a snapshot of the fifty-two
under-the-radar nonseparation-of-powers cases: For the most part, they
involve legal challenges to statutes whose constitutionality had been
called into question by a Supreme Court ruling about the same provision,
a related provision, or an analogous statutory provision. Here are two ex-
amples: After the Supreme Court’s 1975 invalidation of a gender-based
classification in the Social Security Act, the Solicitor General refused to
defend ongoing challenges to the same statutory provision.267 Similarly,
in 1999, after the Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot abrogate
state sovereign immunity by permitting private damage awards for viola-
tion of patent laws,268 the Solicitor General refused to defend an analo-
gous abrogation provision in federal copyright law.269
These and similar cases are clear instances where the Solicitor
General sees little to be gained from defending a federal statute that
clearly runs against Supreme Court precedent, typically recent decisions
(so there is virtually no chance of the Supreme Court reversing course).
As discussed in Part III, the Solicitor General embraces Court-centric
norms in refusing to defend such statutes because she has a general inter-
est in winning and also wishes to bolster her bond to the Court.270
What of the nine high-profile refusals to defend?271 Was Supreme
Court precedent equally clear or, alternatively, were these instances
where the DOJ is putting its legal policy agenda ahead of its obligation to
defend federal statutes? Two were clearly unconstitutional provisions that
Congress apparently included in the statutes by mistake; the President
refused to either enforce or defend and no member of Congress ob-
267. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court invalidated section 202 of the Social Security
Act which provided some death and disability benefits to widows but not widowers. 420
U.S. 636, 653 (1975). Following that ruling, the Solicitor General understandably refused
to defend section 202 in six other cases. See Senate List, supra note 262 (describing DOJ R
communications with Congress regarding its refusal to defend certain statutes); see also
Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Clients, 59 Wash. U. L.Q. 337, 344
(1981) (describing Solicitor General’s actions after Weinberger and subsequent
Congressional response).
268. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999).
269. See Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1086 (discussing decision not to R
defend abortion provision in copyright law).
270. Moreover, as we discuss, the refusal to defend such statutes is not at odds with
the President’s interest in allocating scarce executive branch resources. See infra Part V
(noting President need not pursue losing arguments before Supreme Court).
271. With the exception of the Ford and George W. Bush administrations, every other
administration during the 1975–2011 period was involved in at least one of these nine
cases. See infra notes 272–293 and accompanying text (discussing high-profile duty to R
defend cases).
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jected.272 Another was a statute that the DOJ defended but declined to
appeal an adverse judgment to the Supreme Court (arguably to press an
alternative defense of the statute in the district court).273 With respect to
four statutes, the DOJ flip-flopped, either refusing to defend and then
defending or vice-versa. Finally, the DOJ refused to defend before the
Supreme Court two statutes upheld as constitutional by a federal court of
appeals.
STATUTES THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECLINED TO DEFEND274
Did refusal
deviate from
judicial
decisions or the
practices of this
Statutory Reason for or other
Case Name Provision at Issue Administration refusal administrations?
Sanger v. Reno, 18 U.S.C. Clinton Clearly No.
966 F. Supp. 151 § 1462(c) (1994) unconstitutional.
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (criminalizing
Internet
provisions
concerning
abortion)
N.Y. State Bar 42 U.S.C. Clinton Clearly No.
Ass’n. v. Reno, § 1320a–7b(a)(6) unconstitutional.
999 F. Supp. 710 (1994) (holding
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) attorneys
criminally liable
for helping
elderly qualify for
Medicaid by
transferring
property)
272. See supra note 242 (discussing addition of abortion provision to R
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and addition of attorney liability provision to Medicaid
statute).
273. The statute in question is the now-repealed Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell [DADT] ban
on military service members found to be gay. See Jess Bravin & Laura Meckler, Obama
Avoids Test on Gays in Military, Wall St. J., May 19, 2009, at A3. Significantly, even after the
repeal of the statute but before the Department of Defense had implemented that repeal,
the Obama administration continued to defend Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. See Jennifer
Epstein, Fed Court: End ‘Don’t Ask’ Now, Politico (July 6, 2011, 4:09 PM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0711/58439.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
274. While eight of these cases involved a clear refusal to defend, the history of Witt v.
Department of Air Force is more complex. See 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2006), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). The Bush Administration initially chose
to defend the DADT policy. Witt, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. Although President Obama
urged the repeal of DADT, the Administration continued to defend the statute.
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 n.1, Witt, 739 F.
Supp. 2d 1308 (No. C06-5195), 2010 WL 3921974. After the Ninth Circuit remanded, see
Witt, 527 F.3d 806, the Obama Administration declined to seek certiorari from the
Supreme Court. The choice to accept the remand may have been intended as a weak form
of the refusal to defend. See Jackie Gardina, Let the Small Changes Begin: President
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Witt v. Dep’t of 10 U.S.C. § 654 Obama Decision to Obama
Air Force, 444 F. (2006) (Don’t press an Administration
Supp. 2d 1138 Ask, Don’t Tell alternative said it would
(W.D. Wash. restrictions on defense in defend statute
2006), aff’d in gays in the district court. in subsequent
part, rev’d in military) cases.
part, 527 F.3d
806 (9th Cir.
2008), remanded
to 739 F. Supp.
2d 1308 (W.D.
Wash. 2010)
Metro Broad., Statement of George H.W. Administration Yes. Statute
Inc. v. FCC, 497 Policy on Bush thought statute upheld by
U.S. 547 (1990), Minority unconstitutional. Winter Park
aff’g Winter Park Ownership of Commc’ns, Inc.
Commc’ns, Inc. Broadcasting v. FCC, 873
v. FCC, 873 F.2d Facilities, 68 F.2d 347 (D.C.
347 (D.C. Cir. F.C.C.2d 979; 47 Cir. 1989).
1989), rev’g U.S.C. § 309(i)
Shurberg Broad. (1988) (awarding
of Hartford, Inc. diversity
v. FCC, 876 F.2d preferences in
902 (D.C. Cir. the granting of
1989) broadcasting
licenses)
United States v. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Clinton Would require Yes, at Supreme
Dickerson, 166 (1994) Supreme Court Court. Statute
F.3d 667 (4th (statutorily reversal of had been
Cir. 1999), rev’d overruling precedent. upheld in
530 U.S. 428 Miranda rule) United States v.
(2000) Dickerson, 166
F.3d 667 (4th
Cir. 1999).
League of 47 U.S.C. § 399 Carter Administration Yes. Reagan
Women Voters v. (1978) thought statute Administration
FCC, 547 F. (limitations on unconstitutional. would defend.
Supp. 379 (C.D. editorializing by
Cal. 1982), aff’d, public
468 U.S. 364 broadcasting
(1984) stations)
Turner Broad. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, George H.W. President had Yes. Clinton
Sys. v. FCC, 819 535 (1994) Bush vetoed bill on Administration
F. Supp. 32 (mandating that constitutional would defend.
(D.D.C. 1993), cable companies grounds.
judgment vacated “must carry”
512 U.S. 622 some locally
(1994), licensed
remanded to 910 television
F. Supp. 734 stations)
(D.D.C. 1995),
aff’d 520 U.S.
180 (1997)
Obama, Executive Power, and “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 237, 254
(2009) (suggesting “the decision [to not seek certiorari] is helpful politically . . . sends a
positive message to opponents of [DADT] . . . [and] preserv[es] the First and Ninth
Circuits’ favorable readings of Lawrence.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COL\112-3\COL302.txt unknown Seq: 59 19-MAR-12 16:45
2012] THE INDEFENSIBLE DUTY TO DEFEND 565
United States v. 18 U.S.C. Clinton Statute Yes. George
Knox, 776 F. § 2252(a)(2), (4) unconstitutional. H.W. Bush
Supp. 174 (M.D. (1988) Administration
Pa. 1991), aff’d (criminalizing defended;
977 F.2d 815 (3d possession of Clinton
Cir. 1992), “lascivious administration
judgment vacated exhibition or [a reversed
510 U.S. 939 minor’s] genital position and
(1993), or pubic area”) eventually
remanded to 32 defended.
F.3d 733 (3d Cir.
1994)
Pedersen v. 1 U.S.C. § 7 Obama No reasonable Yes. George W.
Office of Pers. (2006) (Defense arguments. Bush would
Mgmt., No. 3:10- of Marriage Act) defend, and
cv-1750 (D. Obama would
Conn. Nov. 9, defend at start
2010) of his
Administration.
It is impossible to look at these nine episodes without concluding
that the DOJ sometimes compromises its duty to defend in high-visibility
cases, even when no existing exception permits such compromise.275
Consider, for example, the two Supreme Court cases where the Solicitor
General argued that federal legislation was unconstitutional in the face of
federal courts of appeals decisions upholding the statute. In Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, a sharply divided Supreme Court rejected the
Solicitor General’s claims that FCC efforts to expand broadcast diversity
through race preferences were unconstitutional and, in so doing, af-
firmed the D.C. Circuit.276 There is no dispute that the Solicitor General
refused to defend because of the President’s stated opposition to race
preferences, not because Supreme Court doctrine mandated such an out-
come (a conclusion backed up by the Supreme Court’s approval of the
statute).277 There is also no dispute that the Solicitor General, recogniz-
ing potential congressional backlash to the nondefense, allowed the FCC
275. We are not the first to reach this conclusion. Clinton Solicitor General Seth
Waxman (perhaps unintentionally) backs up this claim in his defense of the duty to
defend. Waxman notes that he only refused to defend in cases where he would have to ask
the Court to overrule past precedent; at the same time, Waxman (after referencing two of
the nine cases that we have identified) notes that the DOJ has “occasionally declined to
make professionally respectable arguments, even when available, to defend a statute—
typically, in cases in which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is
unconstitutional.” Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1083. R
276. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The DOJ did not participate in the appeals court case. The
FCC has independent litigation authority on some matters, including the issues raised in
the Metro Broadcasting case. See Devins, Unitariness, supra note 182, at 293–96. Before the R
Supreme Court, however, the FCC did not have independent litigation authority. See id.
277. For a discussion of Bush administration opposition to race preferences, see Neal
Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 955, 982–99
(1993).
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to defend the statute before the Supreme Court.278 By ensuring that the
Supreme Court heard conflicting arguments from two government advo-
cates,279 the Solicitor General advanced his agenda while taking political
reality into account.
The second case where the Solicitor General argued that a federal
court of appeals wrongly upheld the constitutionality of federal legisla-
tion was Dickerson v. United States.280 Here, a lopsided Supreme Court
agreed with the Solicitor General that Congress could not statutorily over-
rule Miranda v. Arizona and, in so doing, rejected the contrary conclusion
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.281 In explaining his decision not
to defend the statute, Clinton Solicitor General Seth Waxman argued
that Miranda was a constitutional decision and that the duty to defend
does not apply in cases where the Solicitor General would have to ask the
Supreme Court to overturn constitutional doctrine.282 That view was also
backed by Democratic lawmakers who had filed a brief extolling
Miranda’s “extraordinary history of acceptance and success in federal law
enforcement.”283 In so doing, Waxman rejected the claims of Republican
lawmakers and the Fourth Circuit that Miranda (and subsequent
278. In particular, the White House feared that the Senate would not confirm Bush
nominees to the FCC. Recognizing the volatility of FCC-Congress relations during the
Reagan era, the Bush administration appointed nominees who backed diversity
preferences and took steps to make sure that the DOJ would allow for a defense of these
preferences (even if this defense came from the FCC and not the DOJ). See Neal Devins,
Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 273, 301–04 (1993) (detailing tensions surrounding
Metro Broadcasting).
279. Because a government advocate defended the constitutionality of diversity
preferences, the DOJ did not notify Congress about its failure to defend the statute. That is
why Metro Broadcasting is one of the two nondefense cases not on the Senate Counsel’s list.
See supra notes 262–266 and accompanying text (discussing communications from DOJ to R
Congress regarding defense of federal statutes).
280. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
281. Id. at 431–32 (“Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be
in effect overruled by an Act of Congress . . . .”); see also United States v. Dickerson, 166
F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428. The DOJ never defended the
constitutionality of the Miranda-override statute. Instead, the Fourth Circuit had sua
sponte asked for briefing on this question before concluding that Congress could
constitutionally nullify the Miranda decision. See Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions:
How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 251, 252 & n.6 (2000) (“[A]cademics and journalists alike have savaged the
appellate court for sua sponte considering the 1968 statute.”). Even though the DOJ
refused to defend the statute, the case was not moot because the government pursued its
criminal prosecution without making use of the defendant’s confession. Id. at 254
(explaining DOJ decided “to argue that the 1968 statute was unconstitutional but that
Dickerson’s confession was admissible under Miranda”). Without a party to defend the
statute, the appellate court appointed Paul Cassell (an academic who had written on the
topic) to defend the statute’s constitutionality. Id. at 252 & n.9. Before the Supreme Court,
Cassell was also asked to argue the case on behalf of the government. See id.
282. Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1087–88. R
283. Brief Amicus Curiae of House Democratic Leadership in Support of Petitioner at
5, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525).
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Supreme Court interpretations of it) created nonconstitutional, prophy-
lactic rules subject to congressional alteration.284
We do not mean to suggest that Waxman simply chose sides in a
political battle or misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent. At the same
time, the refusal to defend the Miranda-override Act highlights the malle-
ability of the duty to defend. There is little doubt that another Solicitor
General could have sided with Act supporters and endorsed the views of
the only appellate court to ever rule on the statute’s constitutionality.
That Solicitor General undoubtedly would have framed her decision as
based on an obligation to defend federal statutes, especially statutes
found constitutional by lower courts of appeal.285 In sum, despite the
availability of plausible arguments in defense of the Miranda-override Act,
Waxman chose not to defend it probably because the administration did
not want him to defend it.
A more vivid illustration of the thinness of the duty to defend occurs
in instances where the Solicitor General changes her position on the de-
fense of a statute, not in response to a change in Supreme Court doctrine
but in response to political events. There are four examples on our list.
Two involve reversals in response to presidential elections (where one
administration refused to defend a statute but the next administration
was willing to defend); two involve decisions by one administration to re-
verse course. Reversals in response to presidential elections are best un-
derstood as the new administration rejecting the constitutional jurispru-
dence of its predecessor. The Carter DOJ concluded that federal
legislation prohibiting public television and radio stations from editorial-
izing and endorsing political candidates unconstitutionally chilled their
First Amendment rights. In 1981, the Reagan Administration agreed to
defend the statute, noting that the Carter DOJ had focused on “some
impermissible applications” of the statute and that a “limiting construc-
tion of the language of the statute is possible.”286 Fifteen years later, in a
284. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives in Support of Affirmance at 7, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No.
99-5525) (arguing Miranda created a “non-constitutional[ ] rule designed to ‘allow the
Court to avoid the constitutional issues associated with state interrogations’” (quoting
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 688)); Brief Amicus Curiae of Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. Urging
Affirmance at 4–5, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525) (“Miranda rules [are]
prophylactic safeguards that are non-constitutional in nature.”). For a detailing of these
claims by the lawyer who argued in favor of the Act’s constitutionality, see generally Paul G.
Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda,
85 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1999).
285. When the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dickerson, the case was
understood as a battle between Republicans and Democrats. Republicans disavowed
Miranda and were committed to making all plausible arguments that the decision be
abandoned; Democrats largely embraced the decision. See Devins, Alternative Take, supra
note 256, at 2071–72 (“Miranda override litigation required the Clinton administration to R
choose sides in a contested battle.”).
286. Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25, 26
(1981). By a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled the act unconstitutional in FCC v.
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case involving the constitutionality of legislation mandating that cable tel-
evision providers “must carry” certain stations, the Clinton DOJ reversed
the position of the Bush I Administration. President Bush thought the
laws unconstitutional, vetoed it on those grounds, and refused to defend
it after Congress overrode his veto.287 President Clinton disagreed and
directed his DOJ to defend the statute.288
In neither of these cases did the incoming administration claim that
it was acting pursuant to some intervening legal development. In neither
case did the new administration claim that a predecessor had misread
Supreme Court rulings on the First Amendment. Applying a different lit-
mus test, the Reagan administration concluded that it could defend a law
that had some permissible applications.289 The Clinton Administration
simply disagreed with the constitutional views of the George H.W. Bush
Administration, never asserting that the latter had misunderstood the
supposed duty to defend. Again, the duty did not apply when it ran
against the executive’s constitutional preferences.
Cases where one administration reverses itself likewise highlight the
ease in which the DOJ can manipulate the duty to defend. We have al-
ready discussed one of these cases, Knox v. United States.290 Here, the
Clinton DOJ initially reversed the Bush DOJ, concluding that a child por-
nography statute was overbroad on First Amendment grounds.291 After
expressions of outrage from Congress and the President, the Department
flipped again.292 This conduct cannot be squared with standard concep-
tions of the duty to defend.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). For additional details, see Devins,
Unitariness, supra note 182, at 293–94 (detailing tumultuous history of FCC v. League of R
Women Voters).
287. See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 65, at 6 (discussing DOJ’s R
decision not to defend “consistent with President Bush’s veto message to Congress”).
288. Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1084. By a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court R
upheld the act in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
289. Within the Carter administration, the Office of Legal Counsel had urged that the
administration defend the statute for precisely this reason. See Note, Executive Discretion,
supra note 17, at 974–76 (“There was also a strong sentiment . . . within the Justice R
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel that the statute should be defended.” (footnote
omitted)).
290. 508 U.S. 959 (1993); see also supra notes 234–238 and accompanying text R
(discussing Knox).
291. The Clinton DOJ’s reversal was made against the backdrop of the Supreme
Court granting certiorari in the case. See Days, A Few Thoughts, supra note 235, at 515
(detailing Clinton DOJ’s involvement in Knox). Consequently, rather than notify Congress
of his decision not to defend, Solicitor General Days confessed error in the case. For this
reason, the Knox litigation was not included in the list of DOJ communications to Congress
regarding its defense of federal statutes.
292. While expressing personal outrage, President Clinton did not personally order
the DOJ to reverse course. See id. at 514–17. Not surprisingly, Attorney General Reno
echoed the concern and took personal charge of the case. See id.
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The most recent case where the DOJ reversed course is the February
2011 decision by the Obama Administration to stop defending the
DOMA in ongoing litigation before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Part I explains how Attorney General Holder refashioned the DOJ posi-
tion on the duty to defend. In particular, the Holder letter argued that
the government was under no obligation to make “plausible” arguments
in defense of federal statutes; its obligation extended only to “reasonable”
arguments.293 Pointing to the “significant history” of discrimination
against gays and the “growing scientific consensus” that sexual orienta-
tion is immutable, Holder concluded that sexual orientation classifica-
tions are subject to heightened review and that the DOJ cannot defend a
law that, ultimately, is little more than a manifestation of “moral disap-
proval of gays and lesbians.”294 This change in litigation strategy seemed
prompted, in part, by a desire to reevaluate executive branch policy to-
ward the DOMA.295
Like our other examples, the Holder letter is proof positive that the
DOJ maneuvers around the duty to defend when it needs or wants to do
so. By introducing the novel distinction between plausible and reasonable
arguments, the DOJ highlights that it can create provisos and exceptions
and determine their scope as it suits its interests. Furthermore, rather
than adopting the standard of review most favorable to the government,
the DOJ argued that strict scrutiny was applicable. Indeed, the letter sug-
gested that the DOMA was constitutional under rational basis review, not-
ing that the Department had previously advanced “reasonable” argu-
ments in support of it under that “permissive” standard.296 In other
words, the Holder letter suggests that the DOJ—in cases where the
Supreme Court has not articulated a standard of review—should advance
its vision of the Constitution, including the possible embrace of standards
of review (like strict scrutiny) that cut against governmental power. This
approach seems a far cry from the duty to defend; it sounds much more
like an example of interpretive independence.
At the same time, the Holder letter invoked court-centric norms in
ways that limit the DOJ’s ability to clearly articulate the President’s consti-
tutional vision. Holder claims that courts are “final arbiter[s]” of the
Constitution’s meaning.297 That, in part, means that the executive has a
duty to enforce federal statutes in order to tee up litigation disputes for
the courts. It also means that the DOJ is obliged to follow court prece-
293. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5. For discussion of Holder’s recalibration of the
duty to defend, see supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (describing Holder’s R
distinction between plausible and reasonable arguments).
294. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 3–4.
295. See id. at 2 (“[T]he President and I have concluded that . . . Section 3 of DOMA
is unconstitutional.”); see also Charlie Savage, Suits on Same-Sex Marriage May Force
Administration to Take a Stand, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2011, at A14 (“Mr. Obama has
signaled that his administration may be re-evaluating its stance.”).
296. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 6.
297. Id. at 5.
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dent in deciding whether a reasonable argument can be made. Hence
the DOJ’s willingness to challenge the DOMA hinged on the failure of
the courts to enunciate what standard of review should be used in cases
involving same-sex classifications.298
The Holder letter, ultimately, is a curious blend of presidential inter-
pretive autonomy and the DOJ’s obligations to the courts (both its need
to follow appellate and Supreme Court precedent and to enforce laws to
facilitate judicial solutions). The odd combination obfuscates a clear-cut
presentation of the President’s constitutional vision. In part, by premising
its nondefense of the DOMA on the failure of either the Supreme Court
or Second Circuit to establish a clear-cut standard of review for same-sex
classifications, the letter spends significant time engaging in questionable
legal analysis about the applicability of heightened scrutiny (the Supreme
Court has twice declined to hold that discrimination against gays warrants
heightened review and every circuit court that has ruled on the constitu-
tionality of the DOMA has employed rational review).299 More signifi-
cant, by concluding that the DOMA can be defended under rational basis
review, the DOJ inexplicably fails to connect its claim that the DOMA
reflects antigay animus with the inevitable extension of that claim,
namely, that the DOMA irrationally discriminates against gays and lesbi-
ans.300 For reasons detailed in Part III, this approach preserves the De-
partment’s special relationship with the courts, and it largely shields the
Department from potential congressional retaliation. The statute is still
enforced, arguments for its defense are still made in court, and DOJ op-
position to the statute is contingent on a judicial determination that strict
review is appropriate.301 But all these benefits for the DOJ come at the
cost of obscuring and, possibly sacrificing, the President’s constitutional
vision.
298. Id. at 4. The DOMA case originated in the Second Circuit, a circuit that had not
sorted out what standard of review should be utilized in same-sex cases. The letter states
that the DOJ, if asked whether the law was sustainable under rational basis review, would
reiterate its past view that “reasonable” arguments in support of the DOMA can be made
under rational basis review. Id. at 5. At the same time, unless and until the Supreme Court
found rational basis review to be the appropriate standard, it is likely that the DOJ would
pursue its nondefense of the DOMA (so that it would likely appeal a lower court ruling
that rational basis review was the appropriate standard, at least if the lower court upheld
the statute).
299. See generally Winkler, supra note 3 (describing precedent applying rationality
review to sexual orientation discrimination claims).
300. The Holder letter and subsequent judicial filings both claim that the DOMA “was
motivated in substantial part by animus toward gay and lesbian individuals and their
intimate relations” and therefore serves no legitimate policy objective. Defendants’ Brief in
Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 23, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp.
2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. C 3:10-00257-JSW).
301. Moreover, with Democrats firmly opposed to the DOMA, there is next-to-no risk
of formal Congressional retaliation. See supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text R
(discussing Congress’s response to the DOMA announcement); see also supra note 221 R
and accompanying text (discussing how party polarization may limit Congress’s ability to
countermand the DOJ).
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In cases where the DOJ or President has a strong constitutional vi-
sion seemingly at odds with the duty, the DOJ will look for ways to pursue
its preferred constitutional vision while giving lip service to the duty. The
separation of powers exception to the duty is a clear example of this prac-
tice as are the high-visibility cases discussed in this Part. It would have
been better had the President advanced his constitutional vision in a
clear and direct way in all these cases. For example, rather than claim that
reasonable arguments in support of the DOMA can be made in circuits
that use rational review, the DOJ should have more forcefully articulated
the constitutional, animus-based objections to the DOMA, no matter the
standard of review.
V. IMAGINING A WORLD WITHOUT DUTIES TO DEFEND OR ENFORCE
This Part considers the practical consequences of our proposals. The
more modest reform is to do away with the duty to defend; the more
sweeping reform eliminates the duty to enforce as well. Under the mod-
est reform, the Obama Administration would enforce but not defend the
DOMA. But unlike Attorney General Holder’s letter (which presupposes
a duty to defend and therefore attempts to explain why the duty does not
apply), we would have the executive make a clear and full-throated claim
that the DOMA is unconstitutional. Under our broader reform, the
Obama Administration would neither enforce nor defend the DOMA.
Perhaps some suppose that in a world without duties to enforce and
defend, the resulting lawlessness and imbalance amongst the branches
would yield something like an elective monarch. Likewise, our more mod-
est proposal may strike some as rather immodest. Given the DOJ’s oft-
expressed fealty to the duty to defend, some may assume that the
President’s powers would be greatly augmented even if he enforced (but
did not defend) laws he believed were unconstitutional. Here we speak to
those who reject our claim that the Constitution forbids the President
from enforcing or defending statutes that he believes are unconstitu-
tional and who also imagine that the President will be too dominant in a
world lacking either a duty to enforce or a duty to defend.
Any concerns about our modest proposal are rather misplaced. If the
President enforces statutes that he believes are unconstitutional but ref-
uses to defend them, we fail to see how this makes the President a jugger-
naut. In this scenario, the President generally enforces the law, even
when he believes it is unconstitutional.302 When a case comes before a
court, no further purpose is served by having the executive advance insin-
302. In separation of powers cases and cases involving the disbursement of
appropriated funds, it is often the case that the only way to facilitate judicial review is for
the President not to enforce the statute. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text R
(discussing option of creating a justiciable controversy while refusing to defend).
Consistent with existing DOJ practices, our modest proposal would back presidential
nonenforcement in these types of cases. See text accompanying supra note 7 (noting DOJ R
support for nonenforcement in separation of powers cases).
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cere arguments when proponents of the law’s constitutionality, most no-
tably members of Congress, can file amicus briefs brimming with sincere
ones.303 Indeed, a law’s proponents are more likely to vigorously defend
the statute than is the Solicitor General, who, in the course of a tepid
defense of a law, might admit its constitutional infirmities.304 If one of
the benefits of the current regime is that the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, ultimately decide the constitutionality of legislation, that
benefit is no less present in an enforce-but-not-defend regime.
If we can satisfy those who insist upon a judicial check on presiden-
tial review, while still allowing the President to speak with his distinct con-
stitutional voice, there is no plausible constitutional argument for a duty
to defend. The duty to defend is a shibboleth that unnecessarily subordi-
nates executive branch constitutional interpretations to the institutional
concerns of the DOJ and thereby subverts our system of overlapping
checks on unconstitutional action. Our more modest proposal is a
marked improvement from a system in which the executive either de-
fends laws it thinks unconstitutional or, alternatively, often implausibly
contends that there is no reasonable constitutional argument for such
laws. There is no societal benefit in maintaining the fiction that the exec-
utive has a duty to defend statutes it believes are unconstitutional.
Apprehensions about our more sweeping reform are more under-
standable. Yet they too are overblown. As discussed below, claims about
interbranch imbalances and executive lawlessness are question-begging
and shed more heat than light. Moreover, fears of presidential aggran-
dizement are rather overstated, for they exaggerate the changes our re-
form would usher. After making these points, we end with a discussion of
practical questions arising from our broader reform.
Although the balance metaphor is an arresting one, predictions of
imbalance are not meaningful or helpful. A need to maintain balance
amongst the branches hardly means that the executive must enforce
those statutes that he regards as unconstitutional. No doubt, supporters
of the duties to enforce and defend fear a domineering President who
would decline to enforce statutes he regards as unconstitutional, thereby
eliminating the possibility of judicial review for some laws. Indeed, some
303. See Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1084–85 (noting Congress R
participates in litigation when President refuses to defend); cf. Brian P. Goldman, Note,
Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court
Decisions?, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 907, 969–71 (2011) (discussing and criticizing Supreme Court
practice of appointing amici to ensure that it hears arguments from both sides of dispute).
304. See Waxman, Defending, supra note 15, at 1081–83 (noting examples of R
Solicitor General raising constitutional doubts about laws he is defending). In the DOMA
case, critics of the Obama Administration accused the DOJ of providing a lackluster
defense of the statutes. See Ed Whelan, More DOMA Sabotage by Eric Holder, Nat’l Rev.
Online (May 9, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/266733/
more-doma-sabotage-eric-holder-ed-whelan (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“What
Holder is instead doing is another step in his two-year-long practice . . . of dishonest and
irresponsible stealth measures to undermine DOMA.”).
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OLC opinions argue that our system of checks and balances rests on judi-
cial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation.305 But by the
same token, many who favor departmentalist approaches to the
Constitution are likely to believe that the status quo reflects a profound
imbalance. Rather than seeing courts as the “final arbiter” of constitu-
tional disputes, departmentalists believe that checks and balances require
each branch to act on its independent sense of the Constitution.
There is no way of refereeing this dispute. Claims of balance or dise-
quilibrium are largely a matter of opinion; in a dispute about percep-
tions, there is no way of “correctly” calibrating governmental power
across all three branches. Consequently, even if the Constitution some-
how requires a balance of power among the three branches that hardly
means that our broader reform is mistaken. To the contrary, many will
believe it absolutely necessary to restore a lost balance.
The claim of lawlessness assumes that when the President refuses to
enforce laws he believes are unconstitutional he puts himself above the
law. This claim, however, ignores the fact that the President is bound by
the Constitution; he would be acting lawlessly were he to enforce and
defend putative statutes that he believes are unconstitutional, just as he
would be acting lawlessly if he implemented the unconstitutional
schemes of his aides. The President does not act lawlessly when he ig-
nores an unconstitutional law any more than courts do when they invoke
the Constitution to ignore a federal or state statute. No one (not even the
DOJ) questions President Jefferson’s decision to ignore the Sedition Act,
despite the fact that many contemporaries rather clearly thought the Act
was constitutional.306
For several practical reasons, the threat of executive aggrandizement
in the duty to defend context is wildly exaggerated, and, consequently,
even our more comprehensive reform will have modest and marginal ef-
fects. To begin with, Presidents are unlikely to refuse to enforce and de-
fend scores of law because they are likely to have a limited constitutional
agenda. Most Presidents do not have fully developed theories of the
Constitution. They are more likely to have developed fiscal, foreign af-
fairs, and domestic policy agendas, because these agendas are far more
important to the public. Recognizing that attention to constitutional mat-
ters comes at the expense of their other agendas, Presidents are likely to
refuse to enforce and defend only when they have strong constitutional
views and are confident that a law is unconstitutional.
305. Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable
Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55–56 (1980) (“[T]he Judicial Branch is ordinarily in a
position to protect both the government and the citizenry from unconstitutional action,
legislative and executive.”).
306. See Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable
Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 279 (1980) (approvingly discussing Jefferson’s
nonenforcement).
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To be sure, most Presidents rely upon aides to highlight constitu-
tional matters. Sometimes these aides will have developed constitutional
perspectives. But the question is whether they will communicate their
views to the President—to set in motion a chain of events that might
cause the President to neither defend nor enforce a law. Keenly aware
that a President has many agendas and duties, officials outside the DOJ
are unlikely to raise many constitutional issues with the White House. Ad-
visors will present constitutional questions to the President only when
they have strong views and when they sense that he is persuadable. Rais-
ing concerns that are repeatedly ignored is a prescription for irrelevancy.
DOJ officials, for reasons detailed in Part III, will be reluctant to raise
constitutional issues because they are bureaucratically predisposed to the
duties to enforce and defend and other principles that curry favor with
Congress and the Supreme Court. Hence, even if the President imple-
mented our broad reform, there is little risk of the DOJ aggressively push-
ing a new constitutional agenda.
We recognize that on some matters, such as socially divisive cases
(like Miranda and the DOMA), a President may have strong constitu-
tional views. Forcing the executive to articulate and defend those views is
far better than the unedifying status quo, one in which Presidents or their
advisers make implausible claims about doctrine to justify their decisions
not to enforce or defend. A forthright presentation of the executive’s
reading of the Constitution is much better for our system of checks and
balances than the Court-centric arguments we now get. As compared to
an argument premised on the questionable claim that the DOMA is
clearly unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court doctrine or one
that conveniently, but mysteriously, largely elides over the duty to defend,
a candid argument against the constitutionality of the DOMA, one
refreshingly free of the Court’s confusing standards of review, would have
been healthy.
Further mitigating the effect of banishing the duties to enforce and
defend is the availability of judicial review in some cases. The OLC, for
example, notes that the only mechanism for the courts to adjudicate the
constitutionality of some statutory restrictions on presidential power is for
the executive to refuse to enforce those laws.307 Also, with respect to a
statute that disperses benefits that the executive ignores on the grounds
that it is unconstitutional, the law’s intended beneficiaries will be able to
bring a case. Should the courts issue a judgment awarding relief, the
President, as the Constitution implicitly requires, must enforce the judg-
ment. The justiciability of some nonenforcement decisions means that
the pool of instances where the President has the final word on the con-
stitutionality of a law is smaller than one might suppose.
307. Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994) (“If the President does not . . . refus[e] to execute
[unconstitutional provisions] there often will be no occasion for judicial consideration of
their constitutionality . . . .”).
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Consider also the President’s nonenforcement of penal statutes. We
admit that no one will have standing to challenge such nonenforce-
ment.308 Yet there would be no marginal impact arising from such non-
enforcement because the President already may exercise the final word
on the constitutionality of penal laws. Using his pardon power, the Presi-
dent may pardon all those who have been punished for violating an un-
constitutional penal statute. And he also may pardon those who have
committed acts that might be prosecuted in the future for violations of
laws that the President believes are unconstitutional. Hence, with respect
to penal laws, elimination of the duties to defend or enforce does not
augment the President’s power in any way. The President would enjoy the
same power he already enjoys, namely whether to enforce a penal statute
he believes is unconstitutional.
This Part ends by returning to our understanding of the President’s
role in our constitutional system. Throughout our analysis, we have ar-
gued that the President cannot ignore his obligation to interpret the
Constitution and act on that interpretation. Yet we are not suggesting
that the President spend all his time thinking about the constitutionality
of legislation. The President cannot screen every existing federal statute
to make sure that he regards it as constitutional for doing this would
require all of his time. The Constitution requires more of the President
than a single-minded focus on its defense. Just as the courts cannot focus
on constitutional cases to the exclusion of all others, so too the President
cannot obsess over the Constitution. Indeed, his presidential oath not
only requires a defense of the Constitution but also a faithful execution
of his office, an execution that requires him, among other things, to di-
rect the executive branch, defend the nation, steward foreign affairs, and
recommend measures to Congress.
Moreover, the Constitution does not oblige the President to advance
a hopeless constitutional agenda. If the lower courts disagree with the
President’s constitutional conclusions and repeatedly award relief to
plaintiffs harmed by his nonenforcement, we do not believe that the
President’s oath requires him to continue to refuse to enforce that law in
future situations. Most obviously, if the Supreme Court has ruled against
the executive in prior cases on nonenforcement, thereby ordering the
executive to abide by a statute it believes is unconstitutional, the execu-
tive is not duty-bound to continue to refuse to enforce. The duty to de-
fend the Constitution does not require the President to be obdurate and
waste resources on futile defenses of his decision not to enforce.
Similar considerations come into play when the President believes a
law is constitutional and the Supreme Court does not. There is little point
in the President’s persistently trying to enforce and defend a statute that
308. There would be no standing because sometimes nonenforcement will not injure
anyone within the meaning of existing standing doctrine. See supra note 49 and R
accompanying text.
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the courts predictably will refuse to honor on the grounds that it is un-
constitutional. Again, the President’s oath does not oblige him to mount
a futile defense of his constitutional vision, when his resources (time,
money, personnel) could be far better expended satisfying his other con-
stitutional obligations.309
Our broader reform, ultimately, is not at all revolutionary. As we
have tried to make clear, to judge its true impact one should not focus on
the total number of laws that the President might refuse to enforce.
Rather one should compare the number of instances where the President
would have the final word on constitutionality under our broader reform
to the number of instances where the President currently has (or could
have if he chose) the final constitutional word. We are confident that the
difference will be marginal. Our broader proposal must be understood
against the backdrop of a President’s necessarily limited constitutional
agenda, his need to satisfy other duties and agendas, his existing ability to
serve as the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of penal laws, his abil-
ity to employ (or create new) capacious exceptions to the duty to enforce
and defend, the bureaucratic incentives of the DOJ to enforce and de-
fend nearly all federal statutes, and the availability of judicial review with
respect to some decisions not to enforce.
CONCLUSION
The duty to defend is a bureaucratic stratagem masquerading as
high-sounding duty. Modern officials in the Department of Justice have
fashioned numerous exceptions—the most important being the presi-
dential powers exception—and invoked or altered them, as it suited their
immediate needs. There is little continuity other than that the duty gets
cast aside whenever there is sufficient pressure or need to do so. On top
of all this, the duty serves no constitutional purpose, for once a case is
before a court, others may defend the law even when the executive will
not. The duty to defend does nothing more than occasionally
subordinate and obscure the President’s constitutional philosophy in ser-
vice of the parochial self-interest of the DOJ.
The duty to enforce is somewhat more defensible because it helps
satisfy those who insist upon judicial resolution of constitutional disputes.
But it too is without strong constitutional foundation. The Constitution
creates a system of reinforcing and overlapping defenses, many of which
rest on independent interpretation of the Constitution. Subordination of
the executive to Congress or the courts undermines that system of consti-
tutional checks and balances. Moreover, the Constitution forbids the
President from executing, and coming to the defense of, schemes he re-
309. For this reason, our proposal will not impact on the Solicitor General’s refusal to
defend laws clearly at odds with settled Supreme Court precedent. See supra notes
267–270 and accompanying text (discussing refusal to defend laws contrary to such R
precedent).
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gards as unconstitutional, even when they come from Congress. DOJ ar-
guments about the need to enforce unconstitutional laws so that the
courts may check executive interpretations merely serve the DOJ’s nar-
row interests.
Those opposed to the elimination of the duty to enforce exaggerate
the resulting changes. The President has a limited constitutional agenda
and his subordinates are unlikely to push him to refuse to enforce and
defend laws on constitutional grounds, meaning the President will rarely
not enforce. Moreover, the availability of judicial review in some nonen-
forcement cases will limit the instances where the President has the final
word on constitutionality. Finally, via the pardon power, the President
already has the final word on the constitutionality of many laws for he
may refuse to enforce penal laws on the grounds that they are
unconstitutional.
Ours is a project meant to advance earnest and independent consti-
tutional interpretation, a modest, yet still significant, improvement over a
regime that creates an atmosphere that makes it more difficult for the
President to further his constitutional agenda and, on occasion, encour-
ages executive duplicity about laws being clearly unconstitutional. We do
not believe that either of our reforms will cure the common cold or feed
the hungry. But we do believe that either would strengthen constitutional
discourse in the political branches, temper judicial arrogance, and re-
store the Constitution’s vision of three equal branches, each responsible
for reaching its own conclusions and acting upon them in defense of the
Constitution.
